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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
 In recent years, social capital has emerged at the forefront of comparative 
research in the areas of philanthropy, community development and international aid.  The 
predominant body of research has been conducted in the United States, Netherlands, and 
other Northern/Western contexts.  From this body of knowledge, the academic 
community has begun to tease out how philanthropic traditions arise within and adapt to a 
given cultural context.   
Social capital, as defined by Putnam, is ‘‘trust, norms and networks that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated efforts’’ (1993, p. 116).  
Putnam theorizes that “social networks provide the channels through which we recruit 
one another for good deeds, and social networks foster norms of reciprocity that 
encourage attention to others’ welfare” (2000, p. 116-117).   
Fukuyama (1995) melds concepts of social capital, civil society, and civic virtues 
to identify a unique cultural distinction between high-trust countries (United States, 
Germany, Japan) and low-trust countries (China, southern Italy, Korea, Latin America).  
According to Fukuyama, the most economically prosperous societies have high levels of 
social trust rooted in traditions of reciprocal moral obligations, inherited ethical habits, 
and shared values.  High levels of trust and reciprocity allow members of society to 
cooperate with one another to realize positive economic outcomes.  The lack of trust or 
presence of distrust inhibits civility, which, in turn, inhibits economic prosperity and 
democracy (Fukuyama, 1995).  Like Fukuyama, Putnam (1993) and Banfield (1958), 
who each studied the cultural differences between northern and southern Italy, also note a 
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distinction between cultures with high trust and robust civic behavior and those with low 
trust and limited civic behavior.  
Stemming from the assertions of Fukuyama, Putnam and Banfield, a theory has 
emerged that high levels of social capital is connected to high levels of philanthropic 
support (money and time), and low levels of social capital is connected to low levels of 
philanthropic support.  This is to be expected since, theoretically, in cultures with less 
trust and civic behavior, there is a higher cost to giving and volunteering, and therefore 
people give less.  Research conducted in American and Dutch communities suggests that 
a high level of philanthropic behavior is expected to be found in places where people 
share a high level of social capital (Putnam, 2000); that individuals who have more social 
capital in terms of access to social networks are more likely to be charitable (Brooks, 
2005; Brown and Ferris, 2007); that a donor’s perception that a nonprofit organization is 
trustworthy affects his or her decision to give (Bekkers, 2003); and that an individual’s 
participation in different types of civic networks relies on varying levels of social trust 
(Uslaner, 2002).   
The United States and Netherlands are each considered to be countries with high 
levels of social trust and dense networks of voluntary associations.  What remains to be 
explored is the construction of philanthropic traditions within a low-trust, low social 
capital cultural context.  If philanthropy is fueled by social capital, is the reverse also true 
that philanthropy is stunted by the lack of social capital?  Much of what we know and 
assume about donor behavior is based on data amassed in countries with traditions of 
robust civil societies, dense associational networks and high levels of interpersonal trust.  
Perhaps our research about philanthropy is so concentrated in such cultural contexts 
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because it is there that we find more clearly defined nonprofit sectors and bountiful data 
about giving patterns and philanthropic trends.  Relatively few social scientists have 
tested the relevancy of these theories in cultures outside of the Northern/Western context.   
This lack of knowledge about traditions of giving and volunteerism in non-
Northern/Western cultural contexts is concerning because social science research is often 
used to inform public policy and international aid decisions.  A richer understanding of 
philanthropic behavior can be gained by studying traditions of giving and volunteerism in 
non-Western/Northern cultures.  Do traditions of giving and volunteerism emerge in a 
non-Western/Northern cultural context that are distinct from or challenge conventional 
thinking about the role and meaning of philanthropy?  
Colombia offers an interesting case study of the interplay between social capital 
and philanthropy because much is known about the Colombian citizenry’s propensity to 
trust and associate.  Additionally, the incredible growth of nonprofits in Colombia and 
Latin America since the early 1990s has spurred an increase in qualitative research 
surrounding Latin American philanthropy.  Key to this discussion is the affirmation that 
traditions and practices of philanthropy are cultural constructs and the donors who create 
them are steeped in their own society’s values, norms, history, and social pressures.  
Understanding the interplay between social capital and philanthropy in the Colombian 
context will require a shift in thinking about social capital from a more or less dynamic to 
an approach which examines the types of networks and trust common to Colombian 
citizens.  The question posed in this paper is not if people in Colombia trust and associate, 
but how. 
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Recognizing the difficulties of collecting apples-to-apples data from two different 
cultural contexts, it must be noted that while much is known about Latin American 
philanthropy in general, little quantitative research could be identified which charts the 
behavior of individual donors in Colombia.  This lack of research may reflect the relative 
newness and ambiguity of the Colombian nonprofit sector and the difficulty of obtaining 
reliable data in Colombia, which, in other countries, is easily gathered through panel 
surveys, tax filings, and nonprofit organization data.  It should also be considered that 
since philanthropic traditions arise to mirror a particular cultural context, perhaps 
Colombia’s traditions of giving and volunteering simply deviate from what scholars in 
Northern/Western contexts define as “philanthropy.”  Perhaps, in the Colombian culture, 
more giving and volunteerism occurs outside of the nonprofit sector, and therefore, the 
full scope of philanthropic activity cannot be accurately depicted from data compiled 
from nonprofit donor lists. 
As an additional caveat, this paper incorporates the work of authors who use 
varying definitions of social capital, social networks, and social trust, and many of them 
debate the theoretical applications of these concepts.  For the purposes of this paper, it is 
less important to debate semantics or any conceptual weaknesses the terminology may 
carry; rather, I intend to offer a better understanding of the Colombian context of social 
capital and how it has played a role in shaping Colombian traditions of giving and 
volunteering. 
In Chapter II, I will chart the development of the Colombian context of social 
capital and explain how the Colombian citizenry trusts and associates with one another.  
In Chapter III, I will examine the literature which connects social capital to philanthropy.  
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In Chapter IV, I will examine Colombian traditions of giving and volunteering and 
attempt to link those traditions to the Colombian context of social capital.  I will conclude 
in Chapter V by outlining considerations for future research conducted in non-
Western/Northern contexts in the areas of social capital and philanthropic studies.  
Ultimately, this paper will develop the position that the role of philanthropy is, at a basic 
level, common to all societies, but that it may manifest in ways that are different in role 
and meaning.  I hypothesize that donors in Colombia are embedded in and react to a 
distinct cultural context; that their philanthropic traditions have developed to mirror this 
cultural context; and that their philanthropic activities may differ in conception and in 
practice from Northern/Western contexts.   
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Chapter II. Social Capital in the Colombian Context 
 
Social capital is generally understood as the social networks and interpersonal 
trust that enables groups of individuals to communicate, cooperate and interact in society 
(Putnam, 1993, 2000; Fukuyama, 2002).  While multiple and often conflicting definitions 
of social capital have emerged since the 1980s and 1990s (as research in this area of 
social science has escalated) scholars generally agree that social capital is a cultural 
construct related to concepts of civility, social cohesion, and civic behavior. Social 
capital can be understood as the tools a society needs to self-organize (Anheier, 2007), to 
band together to defend collective interests and support shared needs (Fukuyama, 2002), 
or to institute informal means of social control (Rosero Bixby, 2006).  
Over the past 20 years, the idea of social capital has gained momentum as an 
important economic factor, similar to human capital (education and skills) and financial 
capital (money used productively), that leads to building a prosperous society (Putnam, 
2000).  Unlike human and financial capital, which are economic tools used by an 
individual, social capital is an inherently collective phenomenon.  Forming the 
foundation of social capital are norms of trust and reciprocity embodied in a civil society 
that fosters social cohesion by facilitating a sense of social inclusion among citizens 
(Anheier, 2007).  However, while the deepest reservoirs of social capital are generally 
considered to be located within civil society, social capital can also be found within the 
family, the market, and the state (Fukuyama, 2002; Sudarsky, 1999).  Social capital 
cannot be coerced; it is voluntary and spontaneous in nature.  Social capital can be 
stimulated or stunted by the state or market sector (Putnam, 2000; Fukuyama, 2002).  
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Fukuyama reminds his readers that “not all societies have equal stocks of social 
capital” (2002, p. 27).  Conventional theories hold that cultures with deep reservoirs of 
social capital tend to have high levels of generalized trust among citizens and complex 
webs of voluntary and associational networks (Putnam, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995).  
Examples of high trust, high associational cultures include the Netherlands, Germany, the 
United States, and Japan at varying degrees (Fukuyama, 1995, 2002; World Values 
Survey Databank, 2008).   
Conversely, these same conventional theories hold that cultures with shallow 
reservoirs of social capital tend to have lower levels of generalized trust among citizens 
and fewer voluntary associations and social networks.  Examples of low trust, low 
associational cultures that are often cited are those found in Latin America, Russia, 
Eastern Europe, and parts of Africa (Fukuyama, 1995, 2002; World Values Survey 
Databank, 2008).   
Researchers attempt to measure the prevalence of social capital in a given 
community in two ways; first, through surveys that ask citizens to report their beliefs 
about who they can trust in their community and the frequency of their participation in 
voluntary and civic organizations; and second, through games and dilemmas that place 
citizens in simulated social situations in order to measure their inclination to trust and to 
reciprocate.  The first method aggregates the responses of individuals to get a 
measurement of the whole community of respondents.  The second method analyzes how 
individuals interact and behave with other members of their community in a controlled 
environment.  
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Utilizing the first method, social scientists participating in the 2005-2008 wave of 
the World Values Survey measure and analyze cultural values and civic behaviors.  The 
World Values Survey Databank charts this information for 57 countries (48 of which 
participated in questions about trust and associations) and serves as a good platform for 
cross-cultural analysis.  According to the Databank, Colombians are among the least 
trusting citizenries of the world.  Only 14 percent of Colombians reportedly believe that 
“most people can be trusted,” while 85 percent of Colombians affirm “you can’t be too 
careful.”  Comparatively, the other participating countries report an average of about 27 
percent of survey respondents who believe that “most people can be trusted” and 69 
percent believe that “you can’t be too careful.”   
Colombians are also among the most civically disengaged citizenries when 
compared to citizens of other nations measured by the World Values Survey Databank.  
Nearly 94 percent of Colombians report that they are not members of any secular 
organization, including charitable organizations, sports and recreational groups, 
professional organizations, and civic organizations.  A large percentage of Colombians 
do engage in religious organizations and churches, however.  With 90% of Colombians 
reporting to be of the Roman Catholic faith (CIA World Factbook) it is no wonder that 
nearly 50% of Colombian citizens report that they are either active or inactive members 
of religious organizations (World Values Survey Databank, 2005-2008 wave).  
At first glance, the stock of social capital in Colombia would seem to be 
concentrated within religious networks, but, according to some social capital theorists, 
religious participation should not contribute to building generalized trust and dense 
voluntary associations in a community (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000).  Putnam (2000) 
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controversially observes that strong religious participation in one predominate church can 
actually decrease the overall level of a society’s social capital.  This is because societies 
are theoretically built along varying levels of “bridging” and “bonding” networks 
(Putnam, 2000).  A bridging network, as the term implies, spans social niches to link 
people to external assets, information, and networks.  Unlike the inclusive nature of the 
bridging form, a bonding network is present in exclusive social niches, bonding people 
together in solidarity along their narrower ethnic, familial, or religious identities.  Putnam 
writes that bonding social capital can create strong in-group loyalty and solidarity, 
forming the ‘superglue’ of society.  Bridging social capital, on the other hand, acts as a 
social ‘WD-40,’ making possible cooperation among people who are not linked along 
narrower ethnic, kinship, or religious networks (Putnam, 2000).  
“Bonding and bridging are not ‘either-or’ categories into which social networks 
can be neatly divided, but ‘more-less’ dimensions along which we can compare different 
forms of social capital” (Putnam, 2000, p. 23).  Therefore, some cultures may have more 
bridging and less bonding, and others more bonding and less bridging.  In countries 
where the majority of people believe there is only one true religion (such as those 
predominated by Catholicism or Islam) citizens tend to be less trusting of outsiders and 
more bonded through hierarchical, religious networks (Putnam, 2000; Fukuyama, 2002; 
Uslaner, 2002; Sudarsky, 2008). Therefore, bridging social capital is less likely to arise in 
cultures where people are predominately Catholic, like Colombia and other countries of 
Latin America, because people are believed to be less accepting of out-groups, and few 
religious networks span across social crevices to connect strangers.  Conventional 
theories also hold that a strong civil society is a conglomeration of many bridging 
 10 
networks and secular voluntary organizations, and that bonding networks and religious 
organizations do not necessarily contribute to the development of a strong civil society.   
Contradicting these assertions, the Catholic Church in Latin America has been 
perhaps the most ardent supporter and protector of civil society during the region’s 
darkest hours of authoritarianism, dictatorship and civil war (Thompson and Landim, 
1997).  In particular, the Liberation Theology of the Catholic Church set forth during the 
Medellin (Colombia) and Puebla (Mexico) Conferences in the latter half of the 20th 
Century actually allowed the Church to be the only civil society institution to sustain its 
structure and defend human and civil rights at a time of widespread and violent upheaval.  
Even today, the Church continues to serve as a major progressive force for defending the 
poor and marginalized and supporting both faith-based and secular charitable 
organizations (Villar, 1998).   
Yet, it is precisely this predominance as a religious and social force in Latin 
American civil society that leads many social capital scholars like Putnam and Fukuyama 
to contend that the Catholic Church fails to build the extra-religious “bridging” networks 
and generalized trust that contributes to strong economies and secular collective action. 
Fukuyama (1995, 2002) sees the more recent liberalization of the Catholic Church 
coupled with the growing Protestant and Evangelical movements in Latin America as 
evidence of significant cultural change and a rise in the types of social capital termed by 
Putnam as “bridging”.  According to Fukuyama (1995, 2002), the sectarian nature of a 
society that embraces various small religious groups stimulates the formation of natural 
networks guided by values of honesty and trust, an inherent necessity for a higher level of 
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circles to welcome others to the faith.  Though controversial, perhaps Fukuyama’s overall 
point is that a plurality of religious organizations may contribute to building “bridging” 
social capital, but in countries where the majority of citizens are followers of one faith 
(i.e. predominantly Catholic or Islamic nations), the singularity of religion may contribute 
to more “bonding” social capital.   
From a certain point of view, the level of secular membership could be considered 
as a kind of proxy for bridging social capital and religious membership for bonding social 
capital.  As illustrated in Figure 1, data from the World Values Survey Databank 
indicates that while Colombia’s secular membership is among the lowest in the world (at 
only 6.3% of Colombia’s population reporting to be either active or inactive members of 
a secular organization), but when religious membership is added to the equation, 
Colombia’s overall membership is comparatively average.  This result may indicate that 
the Colombian citizenry engages in significantly more bonding social capital and 
significantly less bridging social capital than other citizenries of the world.   
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John Sudarsky, chief researcher of BARCAS (Barometer of Social Capital in 
Colombia), a study financed by the Colombian government in the 1990s and 2000s, 
found that high levels of membership and trust in the Catholic Church is indicative of a 
society constructed along lines of strong hierarchical relationships.  Sudarsky points out 
that despite high levels of membership and trust in the Catholic Church and religious 
organizations, Colombia remains on the low end of countries measured by the World 
Values Survey in terms of secular social capital (Sudarsky, 1999, 2008).  
To arrive at this conclusion, Sudarsky tested and analyzed three factors of social 
capital in Colombia.  The first is social capital itself, defined by Sudarsky as dimensions 
of solidarity, reciprocity, political participation, civic engagement, horizontal 
relationships (civil society and secular volunteer organizations), and hierarchical 
relationships (church, guilds, unions).   
Sudarksy’s second factor is trust and confidence in Colombia’s institutional 
infrastructure and a sense of the public’s control over the state.  The second factor of trust 
and confidence is important since the passing of the 1991 Constitution in Colombia that 
(in a very Western model) made the people, and not the state, sovereign.   
The third factor according to Sudarsky is faith in unvalidated sources of 
information (FUSI), which occurs as a result of isolation and a lack of interaction with 
social groups. FUSI decreases when a person regularly interacts within social networks, 
especially civil society organizations, because it is within such networks that citizens can 
independently and productively validate information, opinions, and beliefs (1999).  High 
levels of FUSI may actually be associated with low levels of both bridging and bonding 
social capital since it indicates complete disengagement from associational networks. 
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 Sudarsky (1998, 2007) asserts that civil society and voluntary organizations, 
while weak, are Colombia’s deepest reservoirs of social capital, deeper than any other 
form of network in Colombian society.  Disturbingly, Sudarsky’s research indicates that 
between 1995 and 2007, Colombia’s decline in membership of secular civil society 
organizations was one of the most serious in the world.  The percentage of the Colombian 
population who reported NOT belonging to ANY voluntary organization jumped from 42 
percent to 58 percent, for an increase of 38 percent.  Volunteerism fell from 48 percent to 
36 percent, for a decrease of 25 percent.  
Contributing to these findings, Colombians’ trust in institutional structures fell by 100 
percent.  Even membership in vertically articulated bonding organizations (Catholic 
churches, labor unions, and craftsmen guilds), which have been historically strong in 
Colombia, fell in density and participation, though trust in traditional religious 
organizations and the Catholic Church remains very strong.  Confidence in national and 
municipal governments either grew or remained steady during this time period.   
 Sudarsky views a 133 percent increase in FUSI as the most serious problem for 
Colombia’s future.  Rising FUSI is an indicator of decreasing engagement and supports 
the concerning trend of widespread apathy among the Colombian people.  Sudarsky 
writes that in a country where neither political parties nor the state provide trustworthy 
information to guide citizens and their actions, and where people avoid membership in 
civil society, citizens cannot independently validate information or their opinions.  On the 
whole, these findings indicate an increasingly disengaged citizenry and a very low sense 
of the citizenry’s own civic accountability or public liability.  Without an organized civil 
society strategically supported by the state, Sudarsky concludes that people will remain 
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atomized and fragmented and therefore unable to self-organize and participate in a 
democratic government.  Civil society, according to Sudarsky, should be strategically 
developed by the State because, as Putnam and Fukuyama have also conjectured, strong 
civil society promotes strong social capital, and strong social capital leads to a more 
prosperous nation. 
 The disengagement, atomization, and fragmentation of the Colombian people as 
documented in Sudarsky’s research, is not a short-term blip, but part of a larger cycle of 
distrust fueled by a history of social disorder, corruption, and political opportunism.  
Douglas North’s enlightening comparative study of the historical development of North 
and South America provides an interesting perspective to understanding of social capital 
in the Colombian perspective.  According to North, Summerhill and Weingast (1999), 
after Christopher Columbus sailed to the New World, North and South America shared 
equal chances of economic profitability.  The regions were colonized at the same time by 
expanding European powers; both were endowed with tremendous natural resources; 
each thrived on complex trade routes; and most of the colonies within them received 
independence within the same 40-year timespan.  The differences in political life, culture, 
and economic prosperity of the two regions afterward, therefore, were mainly determined 
by cultural habits, norms and expectations inherited from European colonists.  North 
Americans benefited from their decentralized, parliamentary English heritage, which 
secured property rights and strong limits on the powers of the government, but South 
Americans were cursed with a system inherited from Spanish colonists of centralized 
authoritarianism, familism, and clientelism (North, Summerhill and Weingast, 1999).  
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 Path dependence from either Spain or England determined whether New World 
societies reached a state of political order or disorder.  Political order exists “when 
participants find it in their interest, given their expectations about the actions of others, to 
obey the written and unwritten rules that call for respect for one another” (North, 
Summerhill and Weingast, 1999, p. 4).  For order to occur, citizens must be able to trust 
in the security of one’s life, family and livelihood.  North Americans, for much of their 
history, have prospered under a (mostly) stable and legitimate government, a credible 
justice system, and widespread belief in the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens.  With 
a few noteworthy exceptions (slavery, Jim Crow, McCarthyism), these reliable and 
legitimate institutions have allowed North Americans to “spontaneously socialize” with 
each other (Fukuyama, 1995), and build a reservoir of the powerful generalized trust 
required to span across social niches and connect citizens to assets outside of their insular 
family networks.  
Disorder, on the other hand, occurs when the rights and privileges of individuals 
and organizations are uncertain and when people do not conform to broadly shared 
beliefs, formal and informal norms, or formal laws (North, Summerhill and Weingast, 
1999).  Citizens behave very differently under disorder than order, “that is, when they 
fear for their lives, their families, and their sources of livelihood” (North, Summerhill and 
Weingast, 1999, p. 1).  Much of South American history and culture has been profoundly 
affected by an absence of well-defined and widely accepted rights, nonconformity to 
constantly changing norms and laws, and rent-seeking by the social elite and political 
strongmen who seek to gain and defend their privileges at the expense of others.  In an 
environment of disorder, citizens often prefer the emergence of an authoritarian regime to 
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provide a coerced order and protect their assets.  In the absence of such a regime or a 
credible and legitimate state, a great many groups may grapple for power, and political 
violence ensues. 
Disorder has been the case in much of Colombia’s history.  Colombia’s infamous 
Marxist guerrilla and the paramilitary groups who oppose them were mobilized in the 
middle 20th century from a widespread desire to seek ‘private’ justice when the state was 
too weak, too disinterested or too preoccupied to provide average citizens with legitimate 
legal recourse and civic representation (Jimeno, 2001).  According to Jimeno’s 2001 
account of violence and social life in Colombia, justice-seeking through violence 
continues to be fueled by resources concentrated in personal networks, indicating the 
presence of what some scholars term as “bad civil society” (Edwards, 2004).  The 
number of people who have been internally displaced as a result of the continued armed 
conflict is estimated to number between 1.8 and 3.5 million.  With 38.8 intentional 
homicides per 100,000 people annually, Colombia remains the leader for crime on the 
South American continent (UNODC, 2007). 
Beyond the armed conflict between the guerrilla, paramilitary, and Colombian 
armed forces, social inequality and a country’s distribution of income has a strong impact 
on the level of interpersonal trust among the citizenry (Uslaner, 2002) and fuels much of 
Colombia’s history and modern-day reputation of political upheaval.  Uslaner (2002) 
predicts that more than any other factor, a widening gap between rich and poor leads to 
declining generalized trust in society.  With almost half of all citizens falling below the 
poverty line, Colombia ranks 8th in the world and highest in Latin America for having 
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the most unequal society, according to the GINI index (CIA World Factbook, 2008)1.  
Despite accelerating economic growth, Colombia’s poor continue to be poor, while the 
rich continue to get richer, creating increased social and political exclusion by social class 
(CIA World Factbook, 2008). 
The experience of widespread violence and conflict between social classes has 
lead to a cycle of reinforced social fragmentation. Jimeno writes,  
 
The confusion in distinguishing between violent actors, and 
the easily crossed thin line separating people as friends and 
enemies on opposite sides...” leads to “…a vast feeling of 
fragmentation, understood as being the sensation that 
society has fragmented into pieces either dominated or 
fought over by a great variety of armed actors in the face of 
which the individual is found to have no protection (2001, 
p. 224).  
 
When citizens at all socio-economic levels can no longer differentiate between enemies 
and victims, it becomes difficult to identify and punish social deviants through commonly 
held laws and a legitimate justice system, and informally through widely shared 
unwritten norms and mores.  Theoretically, therefore, social fragmentation and continual 
political violence fuels widespread distrust among the Colombian citizenry.  People 
retreat to their homes, finding truth through experience in the adage ‘you can trust no one 
but your family’ and invest their assets not in economically productive activities, but in 
protecting and defending their kin and livelihoods. 
                                                
1 The GINI index rankings of other Latin American nations include Bolivia (9th), Brazil (10th), Guatemala 
(11th), Honduras (12th), Paraguay (14th), El Salvador (15th), Chile (16th), Panama (17th), Dominican 
Republic (24th), Peru (25th), Mexico (27th), Costa Rica (28th), Uruguay (33rd), Ecuador (34th), Nicaragua 
(46th), Argentina (53rd), Venezuela (56th).  Scandinavian countries are among the most socioeconomically 
equal nations on the GINI index, including Sweden (136th- last on the list), Norway (134th), Finland (125th), 
and the Netherlands (108th).  English-speaking nations rank in the middle, including the United States 
(39th), United Kingdom (92nd) and Canada (101st). 
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Distrust among Colombian citizens in contemporary day-to-day exchanges is 
documented by Cárdenas, Chong and Ñopo (2009) who, through a series of surveys, trust 
games and social dilemmas, compare group-oriented behavior in six capital cities 
throughout Latin America (Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San 
José).  According to the authors, a person can choose to cooperatively organize and pool 
risk with others in a group context, or he or she can choose to free ride even though 
everyone in the group would benefit most if everyone cooperated.  People make decisions 
to cooperate or free ride based on their sense of group affiliation, sympathy toward 
others, and belief in the generalized trustworthiness of others in the group.  Trusting 
others involves the possibility that others participants will defect, creating net losses for 
the trusting person.  If most people are trustworthy, trust is a productive resource, but if 
few people are trustworthy, gullibility can be dangerous.  Distrust and uncertainty about 
the actions of others “exacerbates free riding, thus reducing opportunities to produce 
socially efficient outcomes” (Cárdenas, Chong and Ñopo, 2009, p. 46).  On the other 
hand, if all or most of the participants are able to trust and reciprocate that trust, the 
group’s net social welfare increases.  Reinforced expectations about the honest behavior 
of others are the main driver of generalized trust, reciprocity and cooperation.  
Participants who are both trusting and trustworthy will be more likely to trust others in 
the future, creating a virtuous cycle of reciprocity. 
Cárdenas, Chong and Ñopo conclude that on the whole, the propensity to trust 
and cooperate among Latin Americans is similar to that found in other regions of the 
world, however participants in Bogotá deviated from the other five capital cities.  In a 
trust game, where players were asked to voluntarily contribute some percentage (0%, 
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25%, 50%, 75% or 100%) of imaginary assets to the public good based on their 
expectation that others in their group would also participate, Bogotanos were by far the 
most likely to contribute nothing, indicating their distrust of others to reciprocate.  In 
total, nearly one third of Bogotanos contributed 0% of their money to the public good – 
more than double the average of all other Latin American citizens who contributed 
nothing.  In the risk-pooling game, citizens from Bogotá were by far the least willing to 
participate in risk pooling or participate in shared group accounts.  Bogotanos were also 
the most likely to expect zero participation from others in their group during a risk-
pooling activity.  
The work of Cárdenas, Chong and Ñopo demonstrates that Bogotanos are less 
trusting than people in other major Latin American cities.  Corroborating this piece of 
evidence, the World Values Survey Databank provides a comparative analysis of trust for 
countries throughout the world.  As demonstrated in Figure 2, Colombia ranks 36th out of 
47 nations in the percentage of survey respondents who affirmatively answered, “most 
people can be trusted.”  However, the citizens of Peru, Brazil and Chile are slightly less 
trusting than Colombians. 
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 All of these results indicate that the Colombian citizenry has a relatively low 
level of generalized social trust.  Since civil society is considered to a deep reservoir of 
social capital, declining participation in voluntary organizations could perpetuate a 
serious decline in generalized social trust.  “As the social fabric of a community becomes 
more threadbare,” writes Putnam, “its effectiveness in transmitting and sustaining 
reputations (of trustworthiness) declines, and its power to undergird norms of honesty, 
generalized reciprocity and thin trust is enfeebled” (2000, p. 136).  
“Thin” trust (Putnam’s terminology for generalized trust), is the ability to trust 
and relate to people outside of insular personal networks - strangers in a coffee shop for 
example - based on some expectation of reciprocity and trustworthiness (Putnam, 2000).  
“Thick” trust (Putnam’s terminology for particularized trust) is embedded in strong and 
frequent personal relationships, such as family members and long-time colleagues at 
work.  Thin trust fuels an active community life through bridging networks, while thick 
trust reinforces bonding networks.  “Thin trust is even more useful than thick trust, 
because it extends the radius of trust beyond the roster of people with whom we can 
know personally,” writes Putnam (2000, p. 136).   
Related to thin and thick trust is “spontaneous sociability” described by Francis 
Fukuyama (1995) as a subset of social capital.  Spontaneous sociability, according to 
Fukuyama, “refers to the wide range of intermediate communities distinct from the 
family or those deliberately established by government” (p. 27).  Spontaneous sociability 
relies on a foundation of generalized (thin) trust, or the expectation within the community 
that others will be honest and cooperative.  Spontaneous sociability is important because,   
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In any modern society, organizations are being constantly 
created, destroyed, and modified.  The most useful kind of 
social capital is often not the ability to work under the 
authority of a traditional community or group, but the 
capacity to form new associations and to cooperate within 
the terms of reference they establish (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 
27).   
 
Fukuyama warns that in communities with widespread distrust, people cannot engage in 
spontaneous sociability and can only cooperate under an enforced system of formal rules 
and regulations.  Laws and coercion can replace trust in society as a means to cooperate.  
The coercive enforcement of laws in a distrustful society impose a high transaction cost 
on “all forms of economic activity, a tax that high-trust societies do not have to pay” 
(Fukuyama, 1995, p. 27-28).2  
Varying levels of bridging-bonding networks, thin-thick trust, and spontaneous 
sociability are evident in comparisons of different cultures.  Fukuyama (1995) identifies 
three possible “paths to sociability,” based on where social capital is concentrated in 
different cultures and, concurrently, how cultures organize their economic institutions.  
On the first path, citizens place the majority of their trust in family and kinship networks, 
or, using Putnam’s terminology, “thick trust” and “bonding” networks.  Citizens within 
the first thick-bonding path do not tend to trust those outside of their family networks, 
and therefore arrange their economic and associational ties around kinship. Fukuyama 
suggests that this path can be observed in countries that have many small, family-owned 
and managed businesses but few professionally managed corporations.  Businesses can 
                                                
2 Philanthropy is one type of economic activity which is sensitive to transaction costs and benefits.  
Economists believe that donors are motivated in part by the “price” of giving, and that the level of giving is 
sensitive to the costs and benefits of social norms and expectations, nonprofit output and quality, the social 
status and contributions of other donors, and private benefits including recognition and social status 
(Vesterlund, 2006).   
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grow only as large as the family can manage.  Businesses are constrained by trust because 
the family cannot trust professionals from outside of the family to manage or steward 
their assets. 
On the second path, citizens place greater trust in their community members and 
regularly interact with them through voluntary associations.  Putnam would categorize 
this second path as rich in the thin trust and bridging networks that connect people to 
resources and networks outside of their families and close friends.  Unlike the familistic 
tendencies of the first path, the second thin-bridging path typically produces large, 
professionally managed corporations and complex networks of voluntary associations.  
People are able to trust and work productively with individuals outside of their family or 
religious networks.    
The third path is state authoritarianism.  Citizens place their trust in the state and 
its power to protect their assets.  The third path often results in the creation of state-
owned and operated enterprises.  The first thick-bonding path and the third 
authoritarianistic path are closely related and often overlap.  Familistic cultures in which 
citizens lack trust in strangers and those not “bonded” to them through kinship, religious, 
political or ethnic ties, are often unable to create and protect large, durable economic 
organizations (Fukuyama, 1995).  Because of their deficit of trust toward outsiders, they 
look to the state to protect and enforce their rights to life and livelihoods.   
Banfield in 1958 reached a similar conclusion about the cultural liability of 
familism in his description of civic behavior in a small village in southern Italy.  Banfield 
found that in an atomized society where a person can trust no one but his or her relatives, 
“the weak will favor a regime which will maintain order with a strong hand” (in this case, 
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Fascism), because it protects peasants from social exclusion by the elite, and from mal-
intentioned opportunism by all others (p. 93).  If a culture’s stock of social capital (trust 
and networks) was depicted on a graph, the familistic society would be represented by a 
“U” curve signifying that society is organized along lines of kinship and the authoritarian 
state, but very little spontaneous sociability (civil society) in between.  
Because of rampant opportunism and corruption, many Latin American countries 
experience a persistent cycle of social disorder that can only be squelched by the strong 
arm of the state.  Fukuyama observes: 
 
I have seldom encountered a Latin American audience that 
did not think that their society suffered from a severe crisis 
of trust.  This crisis manifests itself in a variety of forms.  
Economically, the greater part of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in most Latin American countries is produced by 
family-owned businesses – the large majority owned by a 
relatively small circle of ten, twenty, or thirty prominent 
families…  Business life in most of Latin America remains, 
in other words, familistic: the strongest and most reliable 
bonds of trust are among family members, or else among 
relatively small circles of close personal friends.  Social 
capital, thus, resides primarily in kinship networks, and in 
many respects such networks constitute an important social 
asset…  A deficit of trust toward outsiders means that one’s 
strongest relationships of trust are reserved for family and 
close friends, creating the cultural conditions for a two-
tiered moral system in which one feels few compunctions 
in behaving opportunistically toward others (2002, p. 27). 
 
The particular path to sociability a country takes depends on historical turning 
points (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995).  “Path dependence can produce durable 
differences in performance between two societies, even when the formal institutions, 
resources and relative process, and individual preferences in the two are similar” 
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(Putnam, 1995, p. 179).  In the case of Colombia, social fragmentation, high inequality, 
and sustained political violence drastically reduces the prevalence of thin trust among 
neighbors and strangers, inhibits the development of bridging networks, and shatters the 
proclivity of spontaneous sociability and civil society.  Instead, in this atomized society, 
people “bond” through close personal networks which are fused together by thick trust 
and, in the absence of a dense civil society, rely on a central government to provide order 
through bureaucracy and coercion.   
It would not be accurate to claim that Colombia lacks social capital at all, but 
rather that it lacks a high level of bridging social capital or spontaneous sociability. 
Fukuyama acknowledges,  
 
Most developing countries actually have an abundance of 
social capital in the form of kinship groups or traditional 
social groups like lineages, tribes or village associations.  
What they lack are more modern, broad-radius 
organizations that connect across traditional ethnic, class, 
or status boundaries and serve as the basis for modern 
political and economic organizations (2002, p. 34).  
 
Colombian society, it would appear, is structured along lines of bonding networks 
and thick trust.  Colombians reserve trust for family members and religious networks.  
They do not tend to trust strangers or actively engage in spontaneous sociability within a 
secular civil society.  As Chapter III will show, the organization of society is key to the 
development of philanthropic traditions.  A Western/Northern understanding of 
philanthropy assumes that giving is usually extra-familial, not influenced by the state, and 
organized within the nonprofit sector.  According to the literature (which most often 
pertains to research developed in North America, Western Europe and Scandinavia) 
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philanthropy is most likely to flourish when citizens experience high levels of thin trust 
and when they have access to a dense web of social networks.  It would be easy to 
inductively assume that, on the flip side, cultures which are characterized by bonding 
networks and thick trust are likely to have low levels of philanthropic giving.  However, 
this assumption may be false or biased toward a Western model of philanthropy.  
As Chapter IV will demonstrate, Colombian philanthropic traditions flourish 
despite the fact that Colombian culture does not exhibit a strong network of bridging civil 
society organizations or thin trust between strangers.  Instead, as John Sudarsky of the 
BARCAS study found, the most significant source of social capital in the Colombian 
context may actually be within bonding and vertically articulated networks such as the 
church, central government, and family-owned business because it is within these 
hierarchical institutions that citizens place their trust and produce collective action.  
Spontaneous socialization and a horizontally articulated civil society is not natural to 
Colombian culture, and because of this, philanthropy may take place outside of nonprofit 
organizations.  Sudarsky (1999) explains, 
 
The institutions that vertically articulate society have been 
discussed in the literature. Generally these are seen as 
obstacles to social capital, as they block direct access of 
citizens to the State. In Latin America, with the continuous 
reference to fascism and its state corporatism, they are seen 
with special fear, a fear that fits just too well with the lack 
of public representation of interests – no matter how 
socially originated they are – and the traditional mandate to 
represent the “common good.”  However, if what you have 
is a fragmented and atomized society, its is possible that 
this vertical articulation is a powerful source of social 
capital, especially as it generates commitment to decisions 
collectively achieved and the democratic governability that 
such process can generate.  This is the problem presented to 
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the data BARCAS gathered.  There, the different forms of 
vertical articulation were directed towards a positive 
contribution to social capital and the significance and 
polarity of such relationships tested piece by piece.  The 
results indicate a positive relationship of the aggregated 
dimension to social capital, without any individual variable 
having a direct effect on it (p. 19).  
 
As the following chapters will show, a bonding-thick culture may not tend to have 
a dense network of nonprofit and civil society organizations in which it concentrates 
philanthropic action, but the people are no less generous.  In fact, Colombian 
philanthropy may be just as significant as other cultures but channeled through a different 
social model characterized by bonding networks and thick trust.  Traditions of giving and 
volunteerism may be articulated in ways that are not considered “philanthropy” in 
Northern/Western societies.   
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Chapter III. The interplay between social capital and philanthropic giving 
 
As research in philanthropic studies has escalated in recent years, academics have 
investigated donor behavior through a series of disciplinary lenses, including political 
science, economics, sociology, and psychology.  It is important to study donor behavior 
because, as Versterlund points out, “if we do not understand why people give, then how 
can we encourage them to become donors or to increase their contributions, and how can 
we predict the effect changes in the economic environment will have on giving?” (2006, 
p. 568).  Emerging theories on social capital integrate the more traditional fields of study 
to better understand philanthropic behavior from an integrated cultural perspective.  
Bekkers argues that disciplinary boundaries “narrow our vision on civic engagement; 
studies from different disciplinary perspectives are incomplete because they disregard the 
role of the variables that are part of the other discipline” (2005, p. 440).  This chapter 
provides a review of the literature that uses the more integrative approach of social 
capital to understand donor behavior.  It is important to once again point out that the 
majority of this type of thinking and research has been conducted in the United States and 
the Netherlands (which are examples of nations with bridging-thin cultures).  Therefore, 
there is an inherent cultural bias in the research which links social capital and donor 
behavior.   
American social scientist Robert Putnam has become known as the leading 
proponent of the study of social capital.  Through his acclaimed books and work at 
Harvard University, Putnam advanced the comparative study of the linkages between 
networks, trust and generosity in the United States and Italy.  Since the early 1990s, 
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Putnam has developed the much of the terminology and research agenda for the study of 
social capital.3  
Putnam’s work in this area begins with Making Democracy Work (1992), in 
which he describes the cultural differences in civic engagement between northern and 
southern Italy.  Putnam found that strong traditions of civic engagement among the 
citizens of northern Italy made voluntary collective action possible and preferable, while 
the citizens of southern Italy were unable to overcome the immediate material interests of 
the nuclear family in order work together to improve community conditions.  Putnam 
observes, “Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial 
stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement” (p. 167). 
Putnam develops a stronger theoretical link between social capital and 
philanthropic action in his seminal work, Bowling Alone, in which he documents 
declining civic engagement in modern day United States (2000).  Putnam’s research 
charts the civic behaviors of Americans over the past century by analyzing over 100 years 
of Gallup Polls, Roper Social and Political Trends archive, Census Bureau statistics, 
General Social Survey archives, life style surveys, membership data of major 
organizations such as Moose, Kiwanis, and Parent-Teacher Associations and other 
sources. Putnam predicts a causal link between civic engagement and generosity, writing,  
 
Social networks provide the channels through which we 
recruit one another for good deeds, and social networks 
foster norms of reciprocity that encourage attention to 
                                                
3 Since Putnam published Making Democracy Work in 1992 and Bowling Alone in 2000, his theories on 
social capital and the decline of American community have prompted much discussion and criticism.  
Leslie Lenkowski in 2000 reviews the critiques of Putnam in his article, Still ‘Bowling Alone’?. 
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others’ welfare.  Thus... volunteering and philanthropy and 
even spontaneous ‘helping’ are all strongly predicted by 
civic engagement (Putnam 2000, p. 117).   
 
Contradicting more traditional inquiries into donor behavior, Putnam asserts that civic 
engagement outweighs human capital (wealth, education, age, family status, and 
altruism) as a predictor of charitable giving and volunteerism.  “Joiners,” according to 
Putnam, are more likely to engage in philanthropy because they are “more tolerant, less 
cynical, and more empathetic to the misfortunes of others” (p. 288).  
Civic engagement, and in particular volunteerism, is in Putnam’s view a habit-
forming behavior.  “Volunteering fosters more volunteering… organizational 
involvement seems to inculcate civic skills and a lifelong disposition toward altruism” 
(Putnam, 2000, p. 121).  Putnam controversially cautions readers not to confuse civic 
engagement and philanthropy as the former refers to “doing with” and the latter refers to 
“doing for.”  According to Putnam, “a check in an envelope, no matter how generous, 
cannot have that same effect (as civic engagement)” (2000, p. 116).4  
Other academics have been influenced by Putnam’s work, and multiple studies 
have been published which aim to more fully understand the linkages between civic 
engagement, social trust, and generosity.  Several schools of thought have emerged.  First 
are scholars who assert that there is a causal link between engagement in social networks 
and generosity.  Others suggest that there is a causal link between social trust and 
generosity.  A third theory has emerged that joining, trusting, human capital, and 
                                                
4 Putnam’s distinction between “doing for” and “doing with” is often challenged in academia as well as by 
professional fundraisers. It is often argued that fundraising events encourage donors and volunteers to “do 
with” and “do for” at the same time.  For example, volunteers of the Walk for the Cure event organized by 
the Susan G. Komen Foundation recruit others in their own social networks – family, friends, neighbors, 
colleagues, etc. – to raise money and awareness about breast cancer.  
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philanthropy are essentially interrelated.  The following literature review follows the 
development of different perspectives on social capital. 
In the year 2000, the U.S.-based Roper Center released the Social Capital 
Community Benchmark Survey (“SCCBS”), a master databank developed at the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.  The Survey included a national 
sample of about 3,000 respondents in 42 communities throughout the United States.  In 
total, roughly 29,700 households were surveyed during the year 2000.   Respondents 
were asked about their associational activities and attitudes about their local community.  
Emerging from the initial survey were eleven “dimensions of social capital,” including 
social trust, inter-racial trust, diversity of friendships, participation in conventional 
politics, participation in protest politics, civic leadership, associational involvement, 
informal socializing, giving and volunteering, faith-based engagement and equality of 
civic engagement across the community.  Academics have used this rich pool of data to 
develop a richer understanding of the interplay between social capital and philanthropy. 
Utilizing data from the SCCBS, Brown and Ferris (2007) echo Putnam in their 
finding that on an individual level, social capital (networks and trust) may be more 
influential than human capital (education, wealth, age).  Brown and Ferris explain that 
previous philanthropic research did not consider social capital as a potential variable and, 
therefore, overstated the impact of education, wealth and age as the strongest predictors 
of charitable giving and volunteerism.  According to Brown and Ferris, social capital 
most significantly predicts three forms of generous behavior in American society.  An 
individual’s access to social networks significantly predicts his or her giving to secular 
causes. Secondly, an individual’s religiosity is, not surprisingly, the leading predictor of 
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giving to religious causes and organizations.  And thirdly, an individual’s level of trust in 
others is the leading predictor of volunteerism.  
Brooks (2005) also utilizes data from the SCCBS to determine how trust 
influences charitable giving and formulate his theory of the “social trust elasticity of 
giving.”  Brooks, an economist, predicts that social trust, which is not costly in terms of 
time or money, should have a stronger impact on charity than associational networks, 
which are costly in terms of time and money.  Group activities that create an abundance 
of “warm glow,” such as participating in a church fundraiser, should have a higher 
elasticity of giving than those that do not, such as voting in an election.  Secondly, 
Brooks found that trust, which produces only a moderate glow but requires little time or 
money, has a moderate elasticity of giving.  Thirdly, political involvement, which 
requires a lot of time but yields little warm glow, has the lowest elasticity of giving.  He 
concludes that charitable giving is a “beneficial consequence” of volunteerism and trust, 
but is not influenced by political involvement.  
Contrary to Putnam who believes that engagement in social networks leads to 
increased charitable giving, Uslaner (2002) finds that trust, not civic engagement, makes 
a person more generous.  According to Uslaner’s own compilation of research, of the 
many human capital and social capital factors that make a person more likely to be a 
“joiner” or a “donor,” social trust has the strongest impact.  “Trustors” have optimistic 
beliefs about human nature and faith in the good intentions of others, according to 
Uslaner.  “People with faith in others … take active roles in their communities, but civic 
engagement has no effect on trust” (Uslaner, 2002, p. 128).   
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Furthermore, Uslaner asserts that the kinds of social capital celebrated by Putnam 
in his studies in the United States and Italy, such as bowling leagues and choral groups 
(1992, 2000), may actually reinforce patterns of homogeneity because they rely on the 
bonds of insular social groups.  “Congregating with your own kind thus might destroy 
moralistic trust and instead build in-group, or particularized trust” (Uslaner, p. 5).  In 
other words, “bonding” with others in our own social circles does not make us more 
likely to trust strangers or build the powerful “bridging” social capital that fuels 
productivity.  Uslaner theorizes that unlike other forms of civic engagement, philanthropy 
is unique in that it “connects us with people who are different from ourselves.  
(Charitable giving and volunteering) call upon ethical ideals that tie us to the idea that we 
have a responsibility for people in our moral community” (Uslaner, 2002, p. 118). 
Uslaner’s research also suggests that different forms of civic engagement rely on 
different levels of trust.  As demonstrated in Figure 3, participation in charitable 
organizations relies on higher levels of social trust than other forms of civic engagement 
in American society (Uslaner, 2002, p 128). 
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Dutch researcher Rene Bekkers (2003) reaches a similar conclusion to Uslaner 
that trust influences the amount of money that people give to charitable organizations, but 
that the relationship between trust and giving is not reciprocal.  Trust may influence an 
individual’s decision to give a donation, but giving does not increase the individual’s 
level of trust.  Bekkers writes,  
 
 
Figure 3. Civic Engagement and Trust in the United States 
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There are good reasons to expect that the relationship runs 
from trust to giving, and not vice versa.  Because charitable 
donations are usually anonymous, donors usually do not 
know the other donors, nor do they know the recipients…  
To the extent that volunteers collect money, they are 
usually persons who are unknown to the donors.  It is hard 
to imagine how people can evolve into trusting human 
beings through the exchange of some small change for a 
‘thank you’ by a strange person collecting money for a 
charity, let alone through anonymous donations by writing 
a check.  It is much more likely that somehow, some people 
acquired a higher level of trust in fellow citizens than 
others and that these preexisting differences affect the 
willingness to give to charitable causes (p. 598).   
 
Bekkers and Bowman (2009) utilize the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study of 
2003 and find that the decision to start or quit volunteering is rooted in generalized trust.  
People who have high levels of generalized (thin) trust and altruistic values are “more 
likely to start volunteering, are less likely to quit, and are more likely to have charitable 
confidence” (p. 891).  Bekkers and Bowman question whether a recent trend of declining 
levels of confidence in charitable organizations among Dutch citizens would result in 
fewer volunteers overall.  They find that while generalized (thin) trust and altruistic 
values has an effect on volunteerism, the level of a citizenry’s confidence in charities 
does not have a significant effect on the overall level of volunteerism in the Netherlands.  
Likewise, the level volunteerism does not have a significant effect on charitable 
confidence.  However, the authors assert, “individual organizations should be concerned 
about a loss of charitable confidence in them in particular because a signal becomes less 
credible when an organization is criticized externally and is confronted with a loss of 
charitable confidence by the public at large” (p. 894).  
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Nonprofit organizations are often perceived as more trustworthy than profit-
making enterprises because they are prohibited from distributing profits to shareholders.  
Instead of a profit motive, nonprofit organizations are driven by their charitable mission 
to improve the welfare of others.  Nonprofit organizations are most likely to be found in 
situations of information asymmetry, which arise when it is difficult for the average 
consumer to get reliable information on the quality of services provided (such as in the 
provision of healthcare and social services).  Consumers and donors commonly perceive 
they can trust a nonprofit organization more than a for-profit organization because they 
can assume that no private shareholders are profiting from their misfortune.  Religious 
organizations, in particular, have played an important role in facilitating and providing 
charity throughout history.  Religious organizations impart a moral imperative among 
their members to fulfill a social contract or “God’s work,” and are therefore often 
assumed to be trustworthy.  
Donors must be able to ascertain whether or not a nonprofit is trustworthy and 
legitimately seeking to fulfill its charitable mission.  “In the absence of perfect 
information, or high costs of information, donors rely on their impression of 
trustworthiness” to make decisions about donations (Bekkers, 2003, p. 598).  Non-
legitimate organizations that free-ride on the public’s trust but are discovered to have 
violated their social contract reduce the public’s trust in the third sector and support of 
charitable causes (Bekkers, 2003; Bekkers and Bowman, 2009).  
According to Bekkers (2003), mechanisms that increase the transparency of 
nonprofits’ fundraising practices and use of charitable dollars increase the public’s 
overall level of confidence in charities.  In the United States, most nonprofit 
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organizations must provide this financial information to the public through the IRS Form 
990.  Watchdog organizations like Guidestar and Charity Navigator use the Form 990 to 
monitor the effectiveness and transparency of nonprofit organizations.  In the 
Netherlands, where the government does not require nonprofits to file a publically 
available financial document, the Dutch Central Bureau on Fundraising has developed an 
accreditation system for nonprofit organizations.  To receive the seal of accreditation, 
Dutch nonprofits must abide by rules that govern fundraising practices, organizational 
transparency, board selection and governance, and planning and evaluation.  Bekkers 
(2003) found that “people who know the accreditation seal are actually more trusting of 
charities than who do not” (p. 603).  Additionally, people who know the accreditation 
seal were also more generous, giving 71 Euros more than those who do not (Bekkers, 
2003).  
Wiepking and Mass (2009), who also utilize data from the Giving in the 
Netherlands Panel Study of 2003, aim to understand why people with more social and 
human capital are more generous.  Wiepking and Mass find strong evidence that human 
capital factors (education, trust, wealth and cognitive ability) and social network 
extension are interrelated when it comes to explaining charitable giving.  The link 
between generosity and civic engagement may have less to do with size or density of 
social networks and more to do with the human capital factors that propel productivity 
within them.  Wiepking and Mass provide three explanations for this finding.  First, 
having a larger social network gives one more access to charitable markets and decreases 
the transaction costs of making a donation.  It also increases the likelihood of receiving 
charitable solicitations.  Secondly, some networks – especially religious and service 
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organizations – reinforce strong positive norms for charitable giving among members.  
Finally, formal education is linked to increased charitable giving.  Not only do people 
with more education have larger financial resources from which to give, there is also 
evidence to support the theory that people with more formal education also have higher 
cognitive abilities which enable them to comprehend the abstract needs of distant others.  
Additionally, people with more formal education are likely to be more trusting, and 
higher levels of trust leads to increased generosity.  
It must be noted that while the aforementioned studies conducted by Putnam, 
Brown and Ferris, Uslaner, Bekkers and Bowman, and Wiepking and Mass demonstrate a 
link between social capital and philanthropic giving (even though exactly how social 
capital and philanthropy is linked is still unclear), the studies were developed and 
concentrated in the United States and the Netherlands.  Both of these countries are 
characterized as having bridging-thin cultures, robust civil societies, legitimate 
government systems, and productive and developed economies.  When data from 
philanthropic research compiled in bridging-thin cultures is analyzed, the level of 
charitable giving to nonprofit organizations is linked to civic engagement and social trust.  
However, since research is concentrated in and uniquely adapted to how philanthropy is 
organized in bridging-thin contexts, we may not fully understand the connection between 
social capital and philanthropy in a bonding-thick context where nonprofit organizations 
and civil society may not be the primary mobilizer of philanthropic resources.  No similar 
quantitative research that provides a direct link between trust, networks and philanthropy 
in a non-Western/Northern context could be identified.  
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Alleviating this bias must start with developing a better understanding of 
traditions of giving and volunteering in bonding-thick cultures.  Research conducted by 
Wilkinson-Maposa, Fowler, Oliver-Evans and Mulenga (2008) provides an interesting 
view of how the poor in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa help each 
other at the community level.  Though on different continents, these countries are similar 
to Colombia in that all are characterized by high poverty, histories of colonialism, long-
standing social upheaval, and familistic cultures.  What the research team discovered was 
a clear lack of understanding by international aid groups, policy makers and NGOs about 
the reality of giving and reciprocity in the social fabric of the poor in southern Africa.  
Instead of being merely the recipients of top-down, vertically articulated philanthropic 
support, the poor in southern Africa regularly engage in reciprocal, horizontally 
articulated giving within their communities.  The poor are both the source and recipients 
of help, and their social safety net is strongest when they have access to both horizontal 
and vertical aid.   
While Wilkinson-Maposa, Fowler, Oliver-Evans and Mulenga do not directly 
address social capital as a course of study, their research uncovers a more organic 
dynamic between networks, trust and giving.  Who the African poor choose to help and 
not help is clearly articulated in their answers to interviews with researchers. The African 
poor report that they do NOT help people who (directly quoted): 
 
• you cannot trust; 
• you are not on good terms with (those who treat you 
badly or are your enemies); 
• who do not need help (people who are healthy but 
lazy); 
• who will not help the poor (that is, the rich); 
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• who are of low moral character (violent, sly or 
dishonest people, thieves, criminals, cheaters and 
generally ‘bad people’); 
• who do not use help wisely (for example, spend money 
on alcohol); and, 
• who are ungrateful or selfish 
(Wilkinson-Maposa, Fowler, Oliver-Evans and Mulenga, 
2008, p. 39).   
 
Instead, the poor in southern Africa are more likely to help people in the 
following social networks (directly quoted):  
 
• immediate family (spouse/partner, wife/husband, 
parents, children and siblings; 
• extended family (grandparents, grandchildren, cousins, 
nieces, nephews and others) 
• non-family (neighbors, friends, strangers and others) 
• mutual assistance groups (self-help associations, 
volunteer organizations, street committees, women’s 
clubs, work colleagues, grocery societies, and other 
such collective groups) 
• informal associations (burial societies, sports clubs, and 
other associations) 
• formal associations (formal and external organizations 
such as NGOs, religious institutions, welfare 
organizations and other volunteer organizations)  
(Wilkinson-Maposa, Fowler, Oliver-Evans, and Mulenga, 
2008, p. 39).   
 
Interestingly, the natural prioritization of social networks receiving the support of the 
African poor is listed from bonding-thick to bridging-thin.  
While the southern African context will indeed differ from the Colombian context 
of giving (as Chapter IV will show), the point is that whom one trusts and with whom one 
associates matters, and in a broader sense, the cultural dynamic of trust and associations 
is key to shaping traditions of philanthropy in all societies.  
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Chapter IV. Dimensions of Colombian Philanthropy 
 
In Chapter II, it was determined that different cultures exhibit different types of 
social capital. Colombian society is characterized by bonding networks and thick trust.  
Chapter III provided a review of the literature which seeks to understand the linkage 
between social capital and donor behavior.  However, this literature is largely biased 
toward donor behavior in societies which are characterized by bridging networks and thin 
trust.  Despite the bias, one essential fact is clear.  When it comes to philanthropy, whom 
one trusts and with whom one associates matters.  Therefore, it is not a distant theoretical 
leap to suggest that the type of social capital in which a society engages should play a 
role in the development of philanthropic traditions.  If this assertion is true, Colombian 
philanthropy should be channeled through bonding networks and reinforced by thick 
trust.  
As the following discussion will show, Colombian philanthropy is culturally 
constructed and dependent on a historical progression that is unique to Latin America in 
general and Colombia in particular.  I will present this development in terms of three 
overlapping spheres of cultural influence.  Critical to this discussion is a focus on the 
clues which suggest that Colombia’s philanthropic traditions have emerged within 
channels of bonding-thick social capital, and in particular, mirror the Colombian 
society’s preference for associating along vertically articulated social structures and 
concentrating trust along solidarity networks such as kinship and religion.  
First, I will discuss the Catholic roots of philanthropy in Colombia, the Church’s 
lasting effect on how Colombians understand the role and meaning of Christian charity, 
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and those responsible for carrying out charitable work today.  Second, I will discuss the 
development of philanthropy within the context of the elite family and the pressure to 
give through the family business.  Lastly, I will discuss the interplay between the related 
spirits of state-centrism and solidarity among the Colombian citizenry, which, only in the 
last two decades, have contributed to the formal development of a nonprofit sector.  
 
 
Section A. The Religious Sphere:  
Colombia’s Philanthropic Roots in the Catholic Tradition 
 
Even though a formal nonprofit sector is a relatively recent development in 
Colombia, charity and volunteerism is not a new or unfamiliar concept for the Colombian 
people.  In particular, from the colonial period to modern day, community life has 
flourished around the work of the Catholic Church.  Indeed, as many as 80 to 95 percent 
of Colombians consider themselves to be of the Roman Catholic faith.  Giving as an 
affirmation of the Christian faith has always been a major motivation of Latin American 
philanthropy (Sanborn, 2005).  During the colonial period, however, Christian charity 
was not carried out by individuals, but by collectives such as religious orders, 
brotherhoods, and lay beneficence associations (Thompson and Landim, 1997).  These 
religious communities provided relief to the poor and marginalized while spreading the 
Catholic faith and traditions of Christian benevolence among the native and colonial 
populations.   
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The Church’s charitable works were largely funded through a symbiotic 
relationship with the Spanish Crown and landed elites who were appointed to govern the 
colonial state.  During three centuries of Spanish colonial rule (1550 -1810), the Church 
operated according to a hierarchical system known as the Royal Patronage of the Indies, 
through which it served as the sole government agency charged with the task of 
organizing civil society in Latin American nations (Thompson and Landim, 1997).  In 
exchange for protection and privileges provided by the Spanish Crown, the Church 
carried out its mandate to evangelize to the local populations in order to legitimize the 
process of colonization (Villar, 1998).  As Thompson and Landim (1997) observe, 
 
The role of this institution – particularly by way of its 
orders like the Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustines and 
principally the Jesuits through with the Company of Jesus 
as well as the Sisterhood of Saint Charity – was to be 
fundamental in cultivating new spaces, initiatives and 
values which led to what we now call philanthropic 
ventures in the colonial era.  Educational, health and social 
welfare establishments were almost all the responsibility of 
the church practically until the mid-nineteenth century (p. 
339).   
 
On a local level, the State-Church coalition also administered nearly all of the 
philanthropic resources of each municipality, funneling donations, pious works, and 
private bequests toward the public good.  In terms of mobilizing private donations from 
the economic elite during the colonial period, “pious works were seen as a way to 
alleviate growing social inequality and the lack of political power of the marginalized 
classes” (Florez, 1997, p. 387).   
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Even after Colombia declared independence from Spain in 1810, the Church 
remained a pillar of power in Colombia’s central government and continued to operate 
much like before as the principal state-supported charitable entity.  The Church’s 
dominance of civil society and influence in government affairs was repeatedly challenged 
during the political upheavals of the 19th and 20th centuries, during which a strong Liberal 
party sought to sever the church-state relationship and create a secularized government.   
The Liberal party’s interest in placing social welfare under the direct control of 
centralized government agencies was seen as a significant move toward establishing the 
legitimacy of the emerging, but still weak nation-state.  The state’s ability to provide key 
public services was seen as a way to earn the favor of the Colombian people and establish 
order, particularly during a time period in which caudillos (political bosses), strong men 
and the landed elite grappled over local and regional power (Thompson and Landim, 
1997).    
In reaction to the Liberal party’s push toward the secularization of public services, 
and amidst continued disorder, the Church emerged with a newly independent identity – a 
trend common to nearly all the nations of Latin America in the middle 1800s.  As 
Thompson and Landim (1997) note,  
 
Despite global advances in social liberalism, Latin America 
in fact remained heavily controlled by the caudillo, and the 
authoritarian and clientelistic state.  The church, now 
legally separated from the state, became one of the most 
solid institutions in Latin America consolidating itself as a 
corpus of agents and organizations where the philanthropic 
institutions occupied a special place.  From that new 
position, it continued being a strong ally of the state” (p. 
341).   
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Therefore, the development of Colombia’s civil society sector and philanthropic 
traditions was strongly influenced by the separation of church from its formal role as a 
state agency, and the church’s ability to retain its political influence as an independent 
force ever since.  As Colombia’s Liberal movement sought to transfer the administration 
of schools, hospitals and orphanages to municipal governments, the Church initiated what 
would become a century-long alliance with the Conservative party, which supported 
ecclesiastical privileges and the Catholic education of Colombia’s citizens (Villar, 1998).   
By the late 1880s, the political pendulum swung in favor of the Conservative 
party.  The passing of the 1886 Constitution ushered in a nearly 50-year era of rule by the 
Conservatives, which for a century cemented Catholicism as the official state religion and 
the Roman Apostolic Catholic Church’s public role as the chief administrator of 
education and social services.  Once again at the epicenter of Colombian civil society, 
though now influenced by the political and economic pressures of a new era, the Church 
organized private Juntas de Beneficencia (charitable associations) responsible for the 
supervision of schools and orphanages.  These organizations were not largely supported 
by private donations, although landed elites were known to make large donations or 
bequests to the Church for these purposes.  Instead, funding from the state and special 
taxes levied by municipalities constituted the majority of funding the Church required to 
provide education, healthcare, and social services to the masses (Villar, 1998).  
By the 1930s, the Conservative party’s dominance of Colombian government 
ended, and once again a strong Liberal party emerged.  The Liberal party enacted another 
series of social reforms intended to secularize the government and return the 
administration of public education and social welfare to the state.  The emerging 
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authoritarian state clamped down on civil liberties and individual freedoms and restricted 
the development of civil society for fear of the public’s revolt to its oppressive policies.  
The rise of an authoritarian government prompted the development of contra-
governmental organizations and guerrilla movements, strengthened by the personal 
networks of average Colombian citizens who sought social justice in an unjust society.  
Increasing polarization between Liberals and Conservatives led to a tumultuous, 
undeclared civil war known as La Violencia, in which more than 300,000 people died 
from 1945 to 1964 in political violence (Villar, 1998).   
In 1958, as an attempt to end ongoing political violence and reestablish a 
democracy after a short but damaging dictatorship (1953 – 1957), the leaders of the 
Conservative and Liberal parties, the Church, and business associations initiated the 
National Front, an agreement to distribute political power by rotating presidential terms 
between Liberal and Conservative parties every four years (Villar, 1998).   
Despite long-standing factional violence and the predetermined electoral results 
of the National Front, the Church throughout the middle 20th Century retained its 
strength as a pillar of Colombian community and spurred the creation of new faith-based 
confessional associations and educational institutions to fight against the “de-
Christianization” of Colombian civil society, charity and advocacy.  
 
As the only institution in civil society that maintained its 
structure intact after the military takeover, the church 
played a leading role in defending human and civil rights.  
In this strengthening of society, a decisive role was played 
by liberation theology and the guidelines of the Medellin 
(Colombia) and Puebla (Mexico) Conferences in the 1960s.  
These led a considerable portion of the clergy to ‘return to 
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the people,’ in ‘a preferential option for the poor’ 
(Thompson and Landim, 1997, pp. 345-6).   
 
Many members of the clergy severed ties with the Conservative party in favor of 
defending Colombia’s poor and marginalized who were caught in the crossfires of 
guerrilla, paramilitary and armed forces. 
According to Villar (1998), the National Front allowed the Church to move in 
two directions at once.  On one hand, the Church separated from the Conservative party, 
a move that led to the de-politicization of Roman Catholicism in Colombian society and 
the establishment of the Church as an independent mobilizer of Colombian civil society.  
On the other hand, some members of the clergy aligned themselves with left-leaning and 
populist secular NGOs who sought changes in the social, economic and political 
structures of the country.  Encouraged by liberation theology, the Catholic clergy became 
a strong popular voice in the areas of human rights, public education, and empowering 
the poor.   
Weakened by the National Front, the Colombian state consistently struggled to 
provide effective and efficient social services to the masses, leaving the Church to fill in 
the gap.  Today, the Colombian citizenry continue to rely on the Church as the most 
ardent mobilizer of civil society and collective action. Furthermore, the organization of 
Colombia’s nonprofit sector continues to be heavily influenced by a history of the 
Church’s ability to maintain charitable control (in lieu of tax-driven, state control) in the 
areas of education, healthcare, social services and housing.  Non-state agencies (including 
religious and secular organizations) provide 27.7 percent of these services (Gutierrez, 
Franco, and Avella, 2007).  Combined, these four charitable fields account for 70 percent 
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of Colombia’s civil society sector, as measured in terms of total expenditures (Salamon 
and Sokolowski, 2004).  
While the Church’s role in developing Colombian traditions of giving and 
influencing donor behavior is certain, it is difficult to provide a true measurement of the 
Church’s influence in Colombia’s current philanthropic landscape.  Catholic parishes and 
faith based organizations do not make information about their self-financing efforts 
publically available, so it remains difficult to assess precisely the influence that Catholic 
donors and parishes have in the provision of charitable services in contemporary 
Colombian society.  Despite the unavailability of data for donations and tithes, the World 
Values Survey provides evidence that the Colombian citizenry’s active membership in 
the church is higher than average when compared to other nations, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Corroborating this evidence, research by Sudarsky suggests that of all of 
Colombia’s institutions, the Church enjoys the greatest amount of trust among the 
Colombian citizenry, as shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
Because of the Church’s high level of membership and trust and historical role in 
providing a social safety net for Colombian citizens, its ability to mobilize philanthropic 
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action and civil society cannot and should not be ignored.  “Although the Church is 
certainly characterized by an emphasis on hierarchy and obedience to ecclesiastic 
authority, diverse tendencies of Catholicism in Latin America today have institutional 
expressions that form a part of broader civil society, and have strong political and civic 
dimensions” (Sanborn, p. 12, 2005).  
The unique and historical role of the Church as a protector and mobilizer of civil 
society is particularly important to note in the context of social capital.  Conventional 
social capital theory maintains that the dominance of one religious entity may not lead to 
building the thin trust and bridging networks that is believed to fuel philanthropy and 
create a strong civil society.  High levels of thick trust and bonding networks, which are 
perpetuated by the presence of one dominant church, are not expected to result in high 
levels of philanthropic giving.  
In reality, the conventional theory does not pass muster in Colombia in light of 
the available evidence.  Even though records of giving and volunteerism are not released, 
historical accounts and evidence about membership and trust confirms that the bonding-
thick dimension of the Catholic Church plays a major role in channeling charitable 
support, organizing collective action, and sustaining civil society.  Christian principles of 
tithing, fellowship and charity are significant motivating factors in the philanthropic 
behaviors of Colombian citizens.  Because Church records are unavailable, leading 
research projects about the dimensions of philanthropy do not include religious giving 
and volunteerism.  To overlook religious giving as a form of philanthropy skews the 
measurement of Colombian philanthropy downward in comparison to other countries.  
(See Figure 6 for a more detailed illustration of Colombian philanthropy – which 
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excludes religious giving – in comparison to other nations that do count giving to 
religious organizations.) 
 
 
Section B. The Private Sphere:  
The Comingling of Family Wealth and Corporate Giving 
 
Private philanthropy in Colombian society is often described with a distinctly 
familistic term: patriarchal (Letts, 2005; Sanborn, 2005; Villar, 1998; Rojas and Morales, 
2005).  This term stems from two related cultural influences.  First is the traditional 
hierarchical organization of Colombian society in which an elite male embodies the role 
of a “parent” who provides for his “family” through the distribution of food, clothes and 
housing.  “Family” in this case is not necessarily related by blood; instead, family 
includes all the people supported by the elite male and his assets – his wife and children, 
housekeepers, security guards, chauffeurs, the workers at his company and their families.  
Secondly, the use of this parental term is another reflection of the paternalistic style of 
giving inspired by Catholicism in which the clergy (“Fathers”) tend to the spiritual and 
corporal needs the Christian family.  Rojas and Morales (2005) unite these distinctions, 
explaining that philanthropic giving in Colombian society is seen as a continuation of 
Christian community or a family of faith, united along the belief that “one’s fellow man 
is one’s neighbor” (p. 172).  
Even in contemporary Colombian society, corporations cannot be conceptually 
separated from the nuclear and extended families who own them (Letts, 2005; Fukuyama 
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1995).  Fukuyama (1995) notes in his description of the three “paths to sociability” 
(described in Chapter II) that few Latin American companies mature to a point that 
surpasses direct or significant family ownership, management and influence.  In the 
Colombian context, corporate giving is an extension of the private philanthropy of the 
economic and social elite. 
The traditional philanthropic ethos of the elite perpetuates a negative connotation 
of philanthropic work in Colombian society.  As Thompson and Landim (1998) observe,  
 
(Philanthropy) is viewed as an issue for the churches, the 
oligarchy, and the elites.  Though its meaning and practice 
vary from country to country, the public as a whole 
generally view philanthropy as a form of social control by 
the ruling classes.  In the case of individual philanthropists, 
giving has been viewed not as a culturally valuable 
obligation, but simply as a means of increasing one’s 
prestige and social status (p. 355).  
 
The traditionally paternalistic sensibility that guides the donor-beneficiary relationship 
may reinforce patterns of social inequality and dependence in which the rich tend to give 
basic charitable assistance rather than support for transformative programs that empower 
the poor (Sanborn, 2005).  Sanborn observes that historically speaking, “in societies 
marked by longstanding discrimination and social exclusion, the generosity of the elite 
did not always extend to the acceptance of universal suffrage and full citizenship rights 
for the broader population” (2005, p. 7). 
Negative perceptions of the role of elite philanthropy in maintaining a status quo 
of discrimination and social exclusion may be changing, however.  The role of the state 
and church is declining, and the private sector is becoming stronger.  From the 1960s to 
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the 2000s, corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) and corporate foundations led by elite 
business owning families have emerged as the champions of a more progressive vision of 
civil society and leaders in the mobilization of private charitable resources to support it.  
Notable examples of large corporate foundations include the Fundación Corona, 
Fundación Carvajal and Fundación Exito.   
By many accounts, Colombia stands out among Latin American nations for its 
especially strong tradition of corporate philanthropy.  According to Sanborn, between 80 
and 95 percent of the largest corporations in Latin America practice at least some type of 
philanthropy, including donations, employee volunteerism, and the direct operation of a 
foundation or social program (2005).  In 1997, Rojas identified 94 corporate foundations 
with assets of nearly a billion dollars, or one percent of the Colombian GDP and five 
percent of total public expenditures in that year (Rojas and Morales, 2005).  Of these, the 
ten largest foundations accounted for 97.7 percent of total foundation assets, and 60 
percent are now 20 years old or older (Rojas and Morales, 2005).  In comparison, other 
Latin American countries with much larger economies have seen an emergence of much 
smaller corporate foundations only in the last 15 years.   
In 2005, Sanborn conducted a second count of private foundations in Colombia 
and found 122 entities that were private, nonprofit, legally autonomous, and dedicated to 
charitable objectives.  Of these 122 entities, only 16 were identified as grant making 
organizations.  Unlike the North American model in which the majority of foundations 
are primarily engaged in grant making activities and backed by an endowment created by 
one or more wealthy philanthropists, nearly all Colombian foundations were founded by 
a corporate parent or prominent businessman and are continuously resupplied by annual 
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profits (Sanborn, 2005, Rojas and Morales, 2005).  The preference for corporate 
foundations could be linked with Colombia’s familistic culture in which wealth is 
transferred not to charity in the form of an endowed trust but to the next generation of 
their offspring through the ownership and management of large companies, which in turn 
are used to generate wealth from which to be philanthropic.  Sanborn (2005) is skeptical 
about the roots and implications of this practice in Latin America, writing,  
 
For many of Latin America’s civil society leaders, the 
scarcity of local grant making foundations represents a 
serious problem, given the chronic need for resources on 
the part of existing NGOs and community organizations.  
Some also see this as an indicator of persistent mistrust of 
the rest of civil society on the part of social and economic 
elites (pp. 16-17).   
 
Whether or not this practice stems from distrust by the elite is somewhat 
debatable.  It is equally as likely that in a society marred by political disorder and 
economic instability combined with the tremendous and urgent needs of a significant 
number of impoverished citizens, it would be seen as both fiscally unwise and socially 
irresponsible to endow huge resources in perpetuity to generate only a small percentage 
of charitable dollars each year.  
Additionally, the familistic nature of Colombian society has resulted in very few 
professionally managed corporations that are independent of the families who started 
them.  For most business-owning families, wealth is not always distinguishable in terms 
of two clearly understood pools of corporate and private assets.  Instead, the line between 
what belongs to the family and what belongs to the family’s company is much more 
blurry than many Western/Northern societies.  The decision to give in perpetuity to 
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distant others is therefore complicated by the entanglement of assets and pressure to 
reinvest in a company that will be the bread and butter of one’s progeny.  
According to Agüero (2005), the recent emergence of corporate philanthropy, 
particularly in the form of CSR, throughout Latin America has been influenced by three 
factors.  First, CSR is seen as a public relations response to social pressure and public 
scrutiny of the role of the company in society by a better educated and more demanding 
consumer.  Echoing Agüero, Rojas and Morales (2005) cite recent polls conducted to 
measure the public’s perception of trust in private companies and found that companies 
who are identified as generous and noble have a higher positive consumer image.  
Sudarsky’s evidence of the Colombian citizenry’s level of trust in various institutions as 
illustrated in Figure 5 substantiates this fact.   
Secondly, Agüero (2005) found that CSR reflects the changing views of the 
corporate elite in a religious sense as Latin America has become more secular, and in a 
political sense in which businessmen aspire to be viewed as leaders in shaping the role of 
nonprofit organizations in an increasingly pluralistic, free market scenario.   
Thirdly, according to Agüero (2005), CSR emerged from developments in 
business management theory and practice in which the company is conceptualized as a 
part of the larger society and that a healthy society is a more profitable place to conduct 
business.  Because of these three factors, the philanthropic prerogatives of the economic 
and social elite are no longer popularly viewed as paternalistic tactics to reinforce an 
antiquated system of dependence between rich and poor.  Instead, businessmen are seen 
as the main agents of social change and influential in creating a better quality of life for 
all the stakeholders in the community.   
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Similarly to Agüero (who writes about CSR in Latin America in general), Rojas 
and Morales (2005) describe the progression of the role of Colombian corporate 
philanthropy (in particular) since the 1960s in terms of three overlapping “modes of 
intervention.”  First, beginning in the early 1960s, corporate strategy focused on assisting 
the needs of the poor working in or living near the factory.  As previously noted, this 
strategy is characterized in a paternalistic model in which the factory owner considered 
these constituents to be an extended family.  As the patriarch and provider, it was the 
owner’s role to determine how, when, and why to provide for them.  Rojas and Morales 
point out that corporate foundations were first established in regions that were considered 
prone to communist influence, unionization and social rebellion.  Giving to charitable 
causes was in part motivated by the desire to control the justice-seeking activities of the 
poor and marginalized classes rather than empower them to participate in a larger social 
and political dialogue.  As Rojas and Morales (2005) write, “Assistance to the poor is 
characterized by a tutelary relationship between the owner and employees, rather than 
opening a public space of democratic deliberation.  The representation of the factory as a 
big family was seen as a tool for moral rehabilitation and was motivated by paternalism 
and the fear of communism” (p. 173).   
The second mode described by Rojas and Morales is characterized by a corporate 
interest in developmental philanthropy, a trend that was inspired by a dramatic increase in 
poverty in the 1980s.  In that volatile era, the state was pressured to decrease public 
expenses by eliminating subsidies to social service agencies and charging fees for 
services.  As the state relaxed its provision of a public social safety net, it delegated social 
responsibilities to the private sector.  “Along with government and other civil society 
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organizations, foundations began to take part in the planning, co-financing and 
partnership with projects aimed to include the excluded and the vulnerable, leaving aside 
their former simpler role of ‘donors’ or ‘doers of social works’ in the previous 
assistencial model” (Rojas and Morales, 2005, p. 174).  Corporate foundations became 
active in the development of new models of giving designed to help vulnerable 
populations break out of their social conditions by becoming self-sufficient.  Economic 
empowerment programs such as micro-enterprise, community development, training 
programs, and participatory giving were largely propagated by CSR.  However, political 
empowerment was not considered to be a priority as corporations found it in their best 
interest to reinforce the advantages of the corporation rather than the beneficiaries and 
micro-entrepreneurs (Rojas and Morales, 2005).  Furthermore, throughout the process of 
delegating social services to the private sector, the state grappled with widespread public 
apathy and a declining perception of legitimacy in the provision of social programs. 
The third mode described by Rojas and Morales was initiated in reaction to 
legislation.  The 1991 constitutional reform provided official recognition of the civil 
society sector.  Corporations began lending their considerable expertise in the business 
world to nonprofit organizations, investing in institutional strengthening and capacity 
building.  Businesses were no longer seen as top-down donors but participants in 
attaining the social ideal of a “highly participatory civil society, a state with efficient 
institutions with clear and stable rules, systems of security for citizens that resolve 
problems, terrorism, subversion and other problems of violence, and thus the elimination 
of poverty and marginalization” (Consejo Gemial Nacional 1998, quoted in Rojas and 
Morales, 2005, p. 179).  According to Rojas and Morales, this mode shifted the 
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responsibility of corporate foundations away from its traditional role of caring for the 
poor and vulnerable and toward the stewardship of society as a whole.   
Unlike the landed elites of Colombia’s pre- and post- revolutionary societies, 
many of today’s wealthy business owning families are taking an active role in the private-
public discourse to shape Colombian civil society.  Because of their strong, vertically 
articulated influence and capitalist bias toward programs that “pay dividends” of 
strengthening the image of their companies or the environment in which the company 
conducts business, it is unlikely that corporate social responsibility will open many doors 
for non-elites to participate in giving decisions.  While each of Rojas and Morales’ three 
“modes of intervention” are increasingly progressive, each are vertically articulated, 
meaning that wealth and influence follows a downward arrow from top to bottom.  None 
of the “modes of intervention” empowers workers and community members in 
participating in a discourse about how giving should be conducted and directed.  The 
blurry line between family and company assets increases the complexity of inviting 
others in on the philanthropic process.   
Still, in terms of social capital, this vertical mobilization of philanthropic 
resources has proved to channel a tremendous amount of private support toward causes 
and people in need, even if articulated in a patriarchal way.  Like the difficulties of 
measuring the charitable impact of the Church, it is equally as difficult to assess the 
charitable impact of corporate social responsibility and the wealthy families who are 
leading the movement.  In many Western/Northern societies, this information would be 
made public and transparent through a reporting structure to the government in which 
donors file for tax incentives and nonprofit organizations make their financial 
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information available for public view.  Such reporting structures are practiced in 
Colombia, though as Irarrázaval and Guzmán (2005) observe, Colombia, like many Latin 
American countries, lacks the adequate supervisory mechanisms to monitor the use of tax 
incentives and financial reports, or to make them transparent.   
Colombia does provide tax exemptions to charities and incentivizes giving 
through generous deductions.  Donors who make donations to tax-exempt Colombian 
nonprofits can deduct up to 30 percent of their net taxable income for most donations, 
and up to 125 percent of their income for sports, culture and scientific research 
(Irarrázaval and Guzmán, 2005, p. 295).  While significant tax benefits exist, many 
donors may choose not to report donations because of a concern that doing so will 
increase scrutiny of the donor’s finances by tax authorities.  Compounding this worry is 
the particularly high incidence of tax evasion in Colombia, a general lack of awareness 
about how to receive tax benefits, and excessive red tape required to accredit donations 
and recipients of donations (Irarrázaval and Guzmán, 2005).   
Furthermore, “in Latin American countries… no system of accounting or 
compiling ongoing information has been developed on the amounts involved in tax 
incentives, nor are there any registers or databases to support true and effective follow-up 
on nonprofit work” (Irarrázaval and Guzmán, 2005, p. 289).  For all of these reasons, it is 
assumed that the amount of charitable resources that are actually reported by individual 
and corporate donors is the tip of the iceberg.  It is impossible to accurately estimate the 
significance of corporate responsibility or personal charitable giving in Colombia outside 
of the secular nonprofit sector, but it can and should be considered as a significant source 
and mobilizer of philanthropy in Colombian culture.   
 62 
 
Section C. The Public Sphere:  
The Development of a Nonprofit Sector at the Intersection of Private Solidarity and 
State-Centrism 
 
On one hand, philanthropy in modern-day Colombia continues to be traditionally 
hierarchical and largely influenced by notions of Christian charity and the work of the 
Catholic Church.  On the other hand, Colombian philanthropy is increasingly progressive, 
especially as market forces and the family-owned corporate sector continues to shape a 
new vision of Colombian society.  Religion and family are both examples of bonding 
networks united along lines of thick trust and in-group solidarity.  As Fukuyama infers, 
the path dependence of bonding-thick cultures is often coupled with a strong centralized 
state.  This is because citizens in a fragmented and atomized society often prefer the 
presence of an authoritarian power to provide order and defend their lives and livelihoods 
(Banfield, 1958; Fukuyama, 1995).  Colombia’s strong central government and a 
pervasive ethos of state-centrism is evident of the type of “path to sociability” described 
by Fukuyama.  As such, the Colombian public sector has played a vital role in shaping 
philanthropic practices, and more specifically, in articulating the meaning and use of 
private resources for the public good.  
Like many aspects of the formation of Colombian society, the relationship 
between the state and philanthropic activity originated in the aforementioned symbiotic 
partnership between the church and the state.  This relationship was redefined in the 
aftermath of La Violencia in the early 20th century, and especially in the midst of a 
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relatively stable period beginning with the National Front in 1958 and the liberation 
theology of the 1960s.  It was during this era that the church and state officially 
separated, though Catholicism remained the official state religion until 1991. As 
previously noted, the National Front was an agreement between Liberal and 
Conservative parties to end the recurrent political violence of the early 1900s by 
distributing presidential and legislative power every four years.  As a result of a pre-
determined electoral process, the legitimate political participation of the Colombian 
citizenry became essentially moot.  Citizen participation was restricted by the state in an 
attempt to decrease factional violence.  By delegitimizing the political process, the 
National Front led to widespread political inactivity and apathy towards public matters 
among the Colombian citizenry (Villar, 1998).   
At the same time, however, the Colombian citizenry was influenced by the liberal 
movements which characterized the era, most notably by the appeal of the Cuban 
Revolution, the strength of the Soviet Union, and the social justice rhetoric of Pope John 
XXIII (Villar, 1998).  Blocked by a closed and corrupted political system and lured by 
leftist ideology, many citizens sought private justice alternatives and assistance outside of 
the public sphere.  Indeed, widespread exclusion has led to much of Colombia’s political 
conflict, whether it be related to a citizen’s lack of access to the state and the political 
process, to legitimate means to solve conflicts, or to unbiased information accessed 
through a free civil society (Fernando de Angulo, 2002; Sudarsky 2008).   
Beneath the authoritarian control of the state ran strong undercurrents of solidarity 
and reciprocity among the Colombian people, and particularly among the working poor 
and socially marginalized.  In-group solidarity was reinforced both through the work of 
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politically active clergy and lay beneficence organizations as well as secular solidarity 
movements.  In reaction to economic and political exclusion, Colombians created a series 
of solidarity movements to promote the interests of rural farmers, urban workers, women 
of all social classes, and professional networks.  The result was the development of the 
Sector de Economía Solidaria (Solidarity Economy Sector), which Mera (2003) describes 
as “the group of cooperative organizations, auxiliary cooperative institutions, pre-
cooperative organizations, mutual associations, and employees’ funds, which carry out 
economic- oriented activities but use net earnings (reserves) to improve human 
development of their stakeholders” (p. 2).   
Solidarity Economic Organizations (SEOs) are horizontally articulated and 
designed to reinforce certain values such as the democratic and equal participation of the 
stakeholders and solidarity of the workforce.  Members of SEO’s are expected to 
maintain a level of economic contribution each year, which is reinvested in activities that 
support the stakeholders.  In 2002, Mera counted 3,959 SEOs with a membership of over 
25,000 workers and 1.26 million stakeholders.  A notable example of a prominent SEO is 
COOTRAFORC (Cooperativa de Trabajo Asociado Agrofrestales del Cauca), an agro-
forestry cooperative located in the city of Cauca whose members supply environmental 
services with high quality expectations and safety standards.  COOTRAFORC also 
contributes to the social and economic development of its members by providing 
technical assistance, financial support and credit, social security, healthcare, literacy and 
education services, and research agreements with local universities.  The workers’ wives 
also receive these and other services, including support for small business development.  
COOTRAFORC also participates in the political arena by advocating for the workers’ 
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collective interests in land use and labor policies as well as conflict-resolution solutions 
between peasants and indigenous people.   
According to Mera (2003), the success of the Solidarity Economy Sector is partly 
rooted in the ability of SEOs to fill the market failures of imperfect information and the 
exclusion of workers from the corporate structure.  SEOs provide small production 
workers with access to larger financial resources, technology, healthcare and influence.  
SEOs allow stakeholders not only to obtain reliable employment, but the opportunity to 
participate in a legitimate and equitable network from which to mobilize collective 
resources to solve problems, enhance the development of human capital, and provide 
inclusion in the greater Colombian economy.  The Solidarity Economy Sector is rooted in 
the bonding-thick form of social capital, which as Sudarsky (2008) suggests, is a useful 
and productive tool to propagate horizontal decision-making, democratic norms and 
peaceful social inclusion among the working poor. 
Although SEOs were and continue to be independent institutions, their 
development has been fueled through significant support from the state, the progressive 
wings of the church, and a variety of international and multinational actors who see such 
institutions as a peaceful answer to providing aid and address the social issues behind 
escalating political violence.  Certainly, solidarity groups are on the fringe of what many 
scholars consider to be part of the nonprofit sector and civil society.   
In contrast to the mostly peaceful ideals of the Solidarity Economy Sector is the 
emergence of a more violent form of in-group solidarity, embodied in Colombia’s 
notorious guerrilla groups, including the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia), the ELN (National Liberation Army, now disarmed), and several others.  At 
 66 
their conception in the 1950s, these groups were inspired by Marxist ideology and took 
up arms to attain a vigilante form of social justice.  Acting in solidarity against the 
economic elite and governing classes, Colombia’s guerrillas became known worldwide as 
terrorists, kidnappers, and assassins.  These efforts continue to be fueled by the lucrative 
proceeds of drug trafficking and extortion plots.  While certainly not philanthropic 
entities, these groups, and the peasant self-defense groups who formed paramilitaries to 
oppose them, feed on bonding-thick social capital, and embody the term “bad civil 
society” as defined by Edwards (2004).  Many citizens voluntarily turned to their brothers 
in arms in order to attain a level of social justice when the government was incapable or 
uninterested in providing serious protection or legitimate space for political participation.  
A great many other Colombian citizens were forced to join the ranks of guerrilla 
movements against their will and under duress.   
In order to recruit members and maintain power, guerrilla leaders have often used 
a type of civil rhetoric designed to appeal to the hearts and minds of the Colombian 
people – a strategy that does not significantly differ from the pleas of many legitimate 
charitable organizations.  Both seek to attain some vision of the greater good.  The 
following 1999 conversation between Alfonso Cano, leader of the FARC, and a journalist 
with Revista Cambio was included in Jimeno’s 2001 chilling account of violence and 
social life in Colombia. 
 
Interviewer:   The mandate from the gigantic manifestation for 
‘NO MORE!’ as an expression of the so-called 
‘civil society’ demanded that the armed actors 
stop violence and war in Colombia. Are you 
prepared to obey this mandate?  
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Cano (FARC): This manifestation can be taken in many ways. In 
this corner are the actors from the conflict.  In the 
other the victims.  This is how the papers read 
the situation… (But) a lot of people interviewed, 
questioned… raised social issues.  No more 
corruption, no more unemployment… no more 
hospital closing.  These arguments are the same 
as those which from another viewpoint, given 
another type of experience, are raised by 
ourselves.  The conflict which the country is 
experiencing is, precisely, one of the 
manifestations of violence.  Perhaps all the more 
dramatic, because all military confrontation is 
horrendous.  
 
Interviewer (insisting): But the mass demonstration was against 
violence! 
 
Cano: Violence is to do away with jobs, it is to deny the 
possibility of having a home.  Violence is to have 
children die of hunger with no means to alleviate 
the situation… This exposes the big lie that there 
are no specific actors responsible for the conflict 
because the big agent of violence is the state. 
Everybody else is a victim…  We, the 
revolutionary guerrillas, are a simple 
consequence of some supremely deep 
contradictions in Colombian society…  There is 
always talk about the state’s majesty, about the 
principle of authority which does not exist in 
Colombia (Revista Cambio, 1999, 28-9, quoted 
in Jimeno, 2001).  
 
Jimeno explains that the message of the FARC and other similar armed groups is 
a reaction to a commonly held belief among Colombia’s large number of working poor 
that the state is an instrument of oppression by the elite, and that the cultural 
representation of authority is arbitrary and deceitful (Jimeno, 2001, p. 231).  The guerrilla 
appeal to the Colombian citizenry by fueling widespread distrust and inserting itself as a 
kind of Robin Hood figure in solidarity with the working poor.  Pablo Escobar, infamous 
 68 
narco-trafficker who rose to international infamy in the 1970s and 80s, adopted the 
morally nebulous sentiment of “steal from the rich and give to the poor.”  Escobar, 
especially in the beginning of his infamy, was well known for his philanthropic works, 
which by scale trumped any legitimate public service provided the state in some regions 
of the country.  Particularly in rural areas, Escobar very publically funded roads and 
bridges, zoos, schools and community centers in an attempt to establish a kind of moral 
justification from his followers.   
 Yet, in the wake of the long-standing disorder is frequent and everyday violence, 
destruction of homes and towns, displacement of families, and the terrorism and 
atomization of society in general.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
estimates Colombia’s internal displacement to be among the most serious in the world 
with as many as 3.4 million people officially registered as internally displaced in 2010.  
Particularly vulnerable to the armed conflict are people living in Colombia’s rural and 
coastal areas.  The Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations who live in these regions 
have been disproportionately affected by forced recruitment and sexual violence by 
armed combatants.   
Though disorder has produced civil violence, it also serves as a rallying cry for 
the development of peaceful solutions.  In her description of a landmine victim who lost 
an arm and vision, Rincon (2003) observes,  
 
It is the horrible reality of the Colombian farmer’s land 
being used as a battlefield by groups that create a war in 
which 99 percent of Colombians do not want…  
Experiences like this, added to the fact that the State is 
incapable of preventing these painful everyday 
circumstances for Colombians or responding to necessities 
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in many regions, provide a strong motivation for civil 
society action” (2003, paragraphs 1 and 2).   
 
In reaction to the constant threat of violence by armed actors coupled with an ingrained 
distrust of the state and widespread corruption among elected officials, the Colombian 
people have begun to take private action through the construction of legitimate civil 
society.  The intense desire for peace has fueled much of the organic growth of the 
nonprofit sector over the last several decades.  However, because the values embraced by 
an open civil society (equality, democracy, philanthropy) had been warped in the rhetoric 
of armed actors in the past, many Colombians continue to harbor a deep suspicion of 
charitable organizations in particular and civil society in general for fear that 
philanthropic support may be used not to help people in need but instead for far more 
violent or fraudulent purposes.  
The state, too, has reacted in support of the development of a nonprofit sector.  
Doing so has allowed the state to regain a level of public support, trust, and legitimacy 
(Villar, 1999).  Principally, the government established Juntas de Acción Communal 
(“JAC’s” or Community Action Committees) in small towns, counties and 
neighborhoods to provide a system of local representation to balance the centrality of the 
government in the capital city of Bogotá.  The JAC of each community plays an 
important civic role as a center for voluntary action and community leadership.  As 
Florez (1997) notes, “The JACs constituted an obligatory way to formalise participation 
over community affairs, aiming to shape decisions over the distribution of state funds and 
the development of priorities in neighbourhoods” (p. 388).  
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From 1962 to 1993, JACs grew from an estimated 9,000 organizations to 42,582 
organizations (Florez, 1997; Villar, 1998).  JACs are funded through a combination of 
government subsidies and philanthropic support from local politicians, neighborhood 
volunteers and private donors.  Though riddled with clientelism and political corruption, 
JACs are typically involved in determining neighborhood priorities for the development 
of education, healthcare, social services as well as physical infrastructure programs 
(Villar, 1998).   
The government also directly supports the emergence of citizens’ associations to 
defend or unite the interests of underserved populations in favor or opposition of 
particular political reforms.  For example, by establishing the Asociación de Usarios 
Campesinos (Association of Peasant Users), the government sought to create a support 
base for agrarian reform.  The Asociación de Usarios Campesinos and its counterpart, the 
INCORA (Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform), provide technical assistance, 
microcredit and advocacy for peasant users.  The political backing of these reform groups 
backfired when two politicized factions emerged from the government’s program: one 
supporting a radical view of independent agrarian reform and the other in opposition and 
dependence on the Agriculture Ministry (Flórez, 1997).   
Women’s organizations, including the Union de Ciudadanas de Colombia (Union 
of Colombian Women Citizens), the Avanzada Femenina Insurgente (Women’s Insurgent 
Advance), and the Union de Mujeres Democraticas (Democratic Women’s Union) 
emerged in the middle 20th century with the support of the state and political parties to 
promote suffrage and the public debate about gender discrimination in the private sector 
(Villar, 1998).  After the right to vote was achieved in 1957, these women’s organizations 
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became a model for the creation of NGOs which now focus on issues of gender equality 
and domestic violence.  Today, women’s NGOs include the Women’s Citizen Union, 
which responds to the needs of upper- and middle-class women, and the Union for 
Democratic Women, which serves rural and working-class women (Villar, 1998).  
In response to a global trend toward increased capitalism, pluralism, and the 
corresponding need to open a democratic space for discourse between the citizen and the 
state, the Colombian government has heavily invested in developing an independent civil 
society, especially in the last twenty years.  Beyond providing direct support to advocacy 
and solidarity organizations, the state has introduced legislation which redefined the 
purpose of the civil society sector in Colombia.  In particular, the concept of an 
independent civil society gained serious traction only after the passage of the 1991 
Constitution.  According to Flórez (1997), the 1991 Constitution provided a structural 
renovation in the relationship between the state and nonprofit entities and their legal 
responsibilities to support the Colombian people.   
However, instead of seeding the emergence of a truly independent nonprofit 
sector, the 1991 Constitution and subsequent laws reinforced a state-centric notion of 
private action for the public good.  As noted by Thompson and Landim (1998),  
 
‘State-Centrism’ continues as a strong component of Latin 
American culture and still shapes people’s understandings of 
the responsibilities between private and public, state and 
society, the individual and the collective.  Democratization, 
however, brought a new actor into the scene: the market, 
and with it the centrality of profits.  This also has changed 
the nature of the traditional debates over the roles of state 
and society in Latin America (p. 368).   
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While the government granted greater autonomy to the nonprofit sector and 
empowered the people of Colombia with freedoms of association, speech, and civic 
participation, it did not necessary outline philanthropy and volunteerism as unique to the 
nonprofit sector or civil society, but in a broader way in which donors and volunteers 
should participate in both private and public initiatives.  Highlighted legislation includes: 
• Article 103 of the Constitution of 1991 defines civil society organizations 
as mechanism for public participation in general, and specifies that the 
state should help train and support professional, civic, union, community, 
youth groups, charities, or common utility NGOs without detriment to the 
organizations’ autonomy.   
• Article 344 of the Constitution of 1991 allows government agencies to 
provide aid to nonprofit entities for the purpose of promoting activities in 
the public’s interest and prohibits the use of congressional subsidies to 
nonprofit entities for the private benefit of state officials.   
• Article 3 of Act 720 of 2001 defines “volunteer” as “any natural person 
who freely and responsibly, without pay for labor, provides time, labor 
and talent to build the common good as individuals or collectively, in 
public or private organizations or elsewhere.”  By the same decree, 
volunteers are to do the following: a) contribute to the development of 
people and communities based on the recognition of human dignity and 
the realization of the core values of the citizenry: life, liberty, solidarity, 
justice and peace; and b) promote, through selfless service, a generous and 
civic participation to articulate and strengthen the social fabric.   
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• Article 4 of Act 720 of 2001 defines appropriate activities for voluntary 
action as “the care of social services, civic, use of leisure and recreation, 
religious, educational, cultural, science, sports, health, development 
cooperation, environmental protection, antitrust economics, and research 
or similar purposes of general interest.”  
• Article 9 of Act 720 of 2001 promotes voluntary action with the outright 
purpose of strengthening civil society and the state.   
Despite the fact that only recently has a formal nonprofit sector emerged in 
Colombia, several attempts have been made to map its dimensions and scope.  Work in 
this area has been lead by the Colombian Centre of Nonprofit Social Beneficence Entities 
(“CIDESAL”) and the Colombian Confederation of NGO’s (“CCONG”) in the early 
1990s, Margarita Flórez in 1997, Rodrigo Villar in 1998 in partnership with Lester 
Salamon and the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, and Roberto 
Gutiérrez, Natalia Franco and Luis Felipe Avella in 2007.   
Research has largely focused on secular nonprofit organizations as defined in a 
Western environment, meaning that to be counted in research, entities must fulfill the 
criterion of: 1) non-profit distributing; 2) private and autonomous from the state; and 3) 
formed to carry out a public mission.  Despite these criteria (which were developed in the 
bridging-thin cultures of the United States and Netherlands), broad terminological 
conflicts persist among practitioners and academics regarding the concepts of civil 
society, non-governmental organizations, and nonprofit organizations in Colombia.  
According to Flórez (1997), even the term “NGO” insinuates only those nonprofit 
organizations that are influenced by “progressive movements” aimed at supporting 
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vulnerable populations through a commitment to social change.  “Less progressive” and 
more traditional private assistance charities, religious charities and corporate foundations 
may enjoy the legal status of nonprofit entities but are not considered “NGO’s” (p. 392).  
Also in question are neighborhood and advocacy associations created by the government 
and political parties, corporate social responsibility programs, religious and faith-based 
organizations, co-operatives and solidarity sector organizations, and professional guilds 
and labor unions (Flórez, 1997).   
Salamon and Sokolowski, leaders of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit 
Sector Project, have provided perhaps the most comprehensive comparison of the size 
and scope of nonprofit sectors throughout the world.  As illustrated in Figure 6, 
Colombia’s nonprofit sector and private philanthropy are significantly smaller than those 
of the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States, but comparable to other Latin 
American nations.  However, it must be emphasized that even their results are skewed 
because the results for Colombia and other South American nations does not incorporate 
religious giving or tithing, and the criteria used in accounting for philanthropic giving did 
not consider quasi-sectorial philanthropic traditions within the state, family, or solidarity 
organizations.  As such, this research significantly underestimates the level of 
philanthropy in Colombia and perhaps most of Latin America.  
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Figure 6. Global Comparison of Civil Society Sector and Private Philanthropy 
Country 
Civil society sector 
workforce (paid staff and 
volunteers) as a 
percentage of the 
economically active 
population 
Measurement of private 
philanthropy (giving and 
volunteering) as a percentage 
of GDP 
   Netherlands 14.40% 4.95% 
Canada 12.10% 2.40% 
United States 9.80% 3.94% 
United Kingdom 8.50% 3.70% 
Argentina 4.80% 2.36% 
Spain* 4.30% 2.10% 
Peru* 2.50% 0.33% 
Colombia* 2.40% 0.60% 
Brazil 1.60% 0.50% 
Mexico* 0.40% 0.12% 
 *Data on giving and volunteering to religious workshop organizations not available. 
Source: Salamon, L.M.; Sokolowski, S.W.; and Associates, 2004.   
 
Based on this scant evidence of giving to secular nonprofit organizations, 
suggestions that “there has never been a ‘culture of philanthropy’ in Latin America as it 
is understood in the United States” (Thompson and Landim, 1998, p. 369), or that 
cultures defined by bonding-thick social capital are less philanthropic is myopic in their 
assessment.  A culture of philanthropy flourishes in Colombia, and though it does differ 
in scope and meaning from philanthropic traditions found in the United States or Western 
Europe, scholars should take care to develop tools to accurately assess the level of giving 
in Latin American context. What must be considered in future research about the link 
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between philanthropy and social capital therefore, is the full Technicolor version of all 
the ways Colombians give and volunteer, both within and outside of the nonprofit sector. 
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Chapter V. Summary and Considerations for Future Research  
 
This paper triangulates three overlapping areas of study: 1) research on social 
capital in the comparative perspective (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1993, 2000; Fukuyama, 
1995; 2002); 2) research which links social capital to philanthropic giving (Bekkers, 
2003, 2005; Bekkers and Bowman, 2009; Brooks, 2005; Brown and Ferris, 2007; 
Uslaner, 1999; Wiepking and Maas, 2009); and 3) available comparative data about trust, 
membership and giving (Salamon, 2005; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Salamon and 
Sokolowsky, 2004; World Values Survey Databank, 2005-2008).  These areas of study 
were then put into theoretical practice through an analysis of Colombian philanthropic 
traditions.  The following five considerations summarize the lessons learned in examining 
social capital and philanthropy in the Colombian context.     
First, whom one trusts and with whom one associates matters.  This simple truth, 
generalized over a society, forms the underpinnings of particular culture of philanthropy.  
The development of trust and networks depends on a culture’s “path to sociability” which 
is influenced by history, politics, and values over time (Fukuyama, 1995).  A culture’s 
philanthropic traditions are constructed along its particular path to sociability.  Social 
capital is one useful lens from which to observe and understand philanthropic traditions 
around the world.  
Secondly, when attempting to understand a particular culture of philanthropy and 
its linkage to social capital, it is most useful to understand the type of trust and networks 
in which the people of that culture engage and describe them in an unbiased way.  
Literature has often used comparative terminology such as “high trust” and “low trust”  
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(Fukuyama, 1995); “amoral familism” versus “enlightened self interest” (Banfield, 
1958); and “moralistic” trust versus “strategic” trust (Uslaner, 2002).  This terminology 
insinuates a better-worse scenario, and by doing so, inserts a kind of cultural superiority 
at worst and normative bias at best.  For the purposes of formulating a stronger 
comparative study, one must overcome cultural bias by understanding social capital in 
terms of its type.  Putnam (2000) theorizes that social capital could be comparatively 
viewed in terms of varying dimensions of bridging and bonding networks and thin and 
thick trust.  Fukuyama (2002) also acknowledges the weakness of using terminological 
dichotomies, explaining that no culture has more or less social capital, rather, trust is 
culturally-constructed along different types of networks (kinship groups or lineages, 
ethnic groups, village associations, religious organizations, government and political 
associations, civil society organizations, etc.).  While there may be other ways to describe 
social capital, it was most productive to describe the Colombian context as generally 
bonding-thick in this paper.   
Thirdly, according to literature, we expect to see a connection between thin trust, 
bridging networks and a robust nonprofit sector.  Theoretically, philanthropy is most 
likely to flourish in such an environment.  However, the development of a secular 
nonprofit sector is only a recent phenomenon in Colombia.  Historically, a significant 
portion of philanthropic activity has been mobilized through religious, family, state, and 
solidarity networks.  This observation is critical because many scholars engaged in the 
comparative study of philanthropy and civil society overlook these indigenous 
philanthropic traditions, and by doing so, offer a misleading view of philanthropic 
activities in countries like Colombia (see Figure 6).  While data is not currently available 
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to pinpoint how much philanthropy takes place outside of secular nonprofit organizations 
in Colombia, we can conclude that current methods of comparative study have room to 
be more inclusive of indigenous philanthropic traditions in non-Western/Northern 
cultures.  
Fourthly, instead of hindering philanthropic activity (as literature expects), the 
bonding-thick dynamic of social capital is a powerful mobilizer of philanthropic activity 
in a fragmented and atomized society like Colombia.  This type of social capital provides 
a culturally relevant means for donors to understand and trust those they are helping and 
how their giving impacts the community.  Conversely, in cultures characterized by the 
bridging-thin dynamic of social capital, donors may be able to have a more faith that 
nonprofits organizations are trustworthy and will use charitable donations to help distant 
others. In the case of Colombia, the nonprofit sector has only recently emerged in the last 
quarter century, and the Colombian citizenry is still in the process of determining its role 
and meaning in their cultural context.  Traditions of giving and volunteerism along lines 
of bonding-thick social capital are unlikely to fade, and Colombian citizens may never 
utilize nonprofit organizations in quite the same way that some bridging-thin cultures do.  
From an international aid perspective, instead introducing practices that have been 
advantageous in bridging-thin cultures, it may be more productive to support the 
development of indigenous philanthropic traditions (Letts, 2005).    
Lastly, more research is needed to test these the assumptions presented in this 
paper in two areas.  First, more information is needed about philanthropy in the 
Colombian culture and the applicability of this approach to studying the interplay of 
philanthropy and social capital in such a context.  Questions that merit answers are: 
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exactly how much do Colombian donors channel philanthropic giving through bonding-
thick relationships, and particularly those outside of the nonprofit sector?  Do 
international actors attempt to understand the cultural dynamics of native Colombian 
philanthropy, and if so, are attempts made to bolster indigenous traditions or to change 
them?  How is fundraising conducted in a bonding-thick environment like Colombia, and 
is this question even relevant considering the tendency toward collective action of 
Colombian citizens through vertically articulated and/or bonding-thick organizations like 
the church, the state, solidarity organizations, and family-owned companies?  Can the 
considerations described in this paper be applied to other non-Western/Northern cultures 
around the world? 
Finally, an expansion of the ideas presented in this paper can transcend giving in 
Colombian society toward the development of techniques for the cross-cultural 
comparative analysis of giving and volunteerism.  Several sources of comparative study 
provide glimpses into cultures of philanthropy around the globe, but none provide a full 
picture.  The fifth wave of the World Values Survey tracks political and sociocultural 
change in 57 countries but provides little data that is directly pertinent to philanthropic 
studies.  Solomon’s work with the Johns Hopkins University Comparative Nonprofit 
Sector Project provides interesting data about private giving to nonprofit organizations, 
but the study is not designed to include details about giving outside of such institutions.  
CIVICUS offers analyses of the dimensions of civil society in different cultural contexts, 
but does not delve into issues of philanthropic studies.  Still other attempts have been 
made to qualitatively describe how culture, region and religion influence philanthropic 
giving.  Hamilton and Ilchman (1995) edit an interesting compilation of works by 
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anthropologists and sociologists that describe traditions of giving in different cultures but 
offer no basis from which to compare these traditions and dimensions.   
Despite the availability of certain types of data, philanthropy in non-Western and 
non-Northern contexts remains poorly understood.  Future research should focus on the 
development of a foundation of criteria in order to objectively analyze and compare 
indigenous philanthropic traditions in different cultural contexts.  Such a body of research 
could be used to inform the activities of transnational actors and public policy makers as 
well as those of grassroots NGOs and indigenous philanthropists.  Using this kind of 
research, we may have a deeper understanding of how much philanthropy occurs within 
the nonprofit sector (religious and secular) versus other sectors of society (families, 
companies, social economy organizations and mutual aid societies, political organizations 
and the state) in non-Western/Northern countries.  Perhaps a clearer understanding of the 
social capital dimensions of bonding and bridging networks, thin and thick trust, and 
vertical and horizontal associative structures could be utilized as a launching pad for the 
development of this kind of comparative research.   
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